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Removing Revlon
Franklin A. Gevurtz*
Abstract
This Article advocates the abolition of the Revlon doctrine—
the junior partner in Delaware’s corporate takeover jurisprudence,
which governs certain contests involving auctions and sales of
control. Revlon arose in the twilight zone created by the overlap
between defenses to hostile tender offers and efforts by directors to
avoid or coerce a shareholder vote on corporate mergers and sales
(shotgun corporate marriages). The narrow holding of the case
stands for the common sense proposition that if directors decide to
sell their corporation by choosing between two bids, both of which
will pay all of the shareholders cash for all of their shares, the
directors should pick the bid that pays the most cash. The
problems arose when Delaware courts assumed that the case had
something to say about situations in which the directors were not
choosing between two all-cash all-shares bids. Specifically, it has
been difficult sensibly to decide in which other cases Revlon has
something relevant to say and to figure out what this something
is. These problems in applying Revlon are not the typical results
one must inevitably expect when courts apply any legal doctrine to
the multitude of grey areas that determine a rule’s scope and
impact. Instead, they reflect a more fundamental difficulty: The
doctrine arising from Revlon has no sensible underlying policy
rationale to guide courts in its application. This is not simply
because courts and commentators have not articulated a sensible
policy. Rather, this is because there is no sensible policy that one
can articulate for Revlon beyond the narrow confines of the
original decision.

* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge
School of Law. I want to thank my colleague, Brian Slocum, for his helpful
comments.
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I. Introduction

A little over a quarter century ago, the Delaware Supreme
Court established the twin pillar edifice governing the conduct of
directors in most takeover contests in the United States.1 The
primary pillar is the Unocal doctrine2—an elegant, if not always
elegantly applied, solution to the positional conflict of interest
besetting directors opposing a hostile tender offer that would
remove them from power.3 A secondary pillar is the Revlon
doctrine4 imposing seemingly more demanding standards in
certain situations involving auctions, the break-up of the
company, or transfers of control.5
In Unocal, the court wrote in a situation in which it was
obvious that the decision would have far reaching implications in
establishing the rules governing directors in the takeover wars
raging through corporate America.6 By contrast, the Revlon case
involved a more specific situation in which directors took actions
to favor one all-cash bid for the company over another all-cash
bid.7 As such, the decision could simply have constituted a
relatively minor refinement of the Unocal doctrine—or even the
business judgment rule—standing for the proposition that once
the directors decide to sell their company by choosing between
two bids, both of which will cash out all of the shareholders, the
only appropriate goal is to get the most cash for the shareholders.
It soon became evident, however, that the scope of the Revlon
decision reached well beyond the narrow confines of the original

1. See infra note 51 (explaining that a majority of public companies
incorporate in Delaware).
2. See generally Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985).
3. See infra notes 50–61 and accompanying text (discussing Unocal).
4. See generally Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
5. See infra notes 116–32 and accompanying text (discussing Revlon).
6. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We
Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 493–97 (2001) (describing the
business environment at the time and the court’s decision to intervene in
takeover controversies).
7. See infra notes 122–28 and accompanying text (describing the facts of
Revlon).
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case to establish a sphere in which a somehow more demanding,
if utterly ill-defined, standard seemingly supplants Unocal.8
The succeeding years have not been kind to the doctrine
arising from Revlon. The boundaries of the area covered by
Revlon have shifted over the course of cases in unpredictable and
paradoxical ways to produce a result that seems to call for greater
judicial scrutiny of directors’ decisions in situations posing less
danger of directors acting in self-interest, while calling for less
judicial scrutiny in situations posing greater danger of directors
acting in self-interest.9 Once entering the area covered by Revlon,
the actual requirements of the doctrine remain mysterious—even
to the courts charged with its application—and create perplexing
anomalies when one seeks to reconcile these requirements with
the broader doctrines governing directors’ conduct in mergers and
acquisitions or even more generally.10 Indeed, so nebulous are the
impacts of triggering Revlon that it may be mislabeling to refer to
Revlon as establishing a doctrine at all.
These problems in applying Revlon are not the typical results
one must inevitably expect when courts apply any legal doctrine
to the multitude of grey areas that determine a rule’s scope and
impact. Instead, they reflect a more fundamental difficulty. In
contrast to the Unocal doctrine, the doctrine arising from Revlon
has no sensible underlying policy rationale to guide courts in its
application. This is not simply because courts and commentators
have not articulated a sensible policy—otherwise this article
might seek to fill the void. Rather, this is because there is no
sensible policy that one can articulate for Revlon beyond the
narrow confines of the original decision.
It is, therefore, time to wipe away the mistake arising from
applying Revlon to cover situations beyond its original foundation
of choosing between two all-cash bids and thereby return
Delaware takeover jurisprudence to the simpler wisdom of the
unadorned Unocal test. To reach this conclusion, this Article will
8. Wags have come to call the cases in which the Revlon doctrine applies,
“Revlon-land.” See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3277, 3280 & n.7 (2013) (describing the use of the term
“Revlon-land”).
9. See infra Part III.A (examining jurisprudence governing the situations
that trigger the Revlon doctrine).
10. See infra Part III.B (examining cases that have applied Revlon).
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proceed as follows: Part II of this Article examines the context out
of which Revlon arose. Part III of this Article then outlines the
problems created by Delaware court opinions seeking both to
determine the scope of situations covered by Revlon, as well as to
determine what impact the doctrine actually has. Finally, Part IV
shows how these problems stem from the lack of any sensible
reason for having the doctrine.
II. Revlon’s Origins
Revlon, like Unocal before it, arose out of the jagged manner
in which corporate law traditionally divides power between
directors and shareholders when it comes to mergers and
acquisitions. The basic model of corporate governance is
republican: Directors have the power to make decisions;11
shareholders have the power to choose the directors.12 Sales and
combinations of corporations depart from this model. Instead of
lodging the power of decision solely with the directors, corporate
statutes generally divide the power so as to require mutual
consent by the directors and shareholders. Directors act as
gatekeepers who must agree to the transaction.13 Shareholders,
however, retain a veto, as they must approve the deal.14
Not surprisingly, this dual consent model has produced
conflict. Like clashing armies seeking to outflank each other on
the battlefield, both shareholders and directors have sought to
limit the other’s veto power and, at the same time, to preserve
their own. The two contexts for this duel involve directors’
11. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011) (“The business and
affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or
under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 8.01(b) (1984) (“[T]he business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed
by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of
directors . . . .”).
12. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (“Directors shall be elected by a
plurality of the votes of the shares . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.28(a)
(“[D]irectors are elected by a plurality of the votes cast by the shares entitled to
vote . . . .”).
13. See infra notes 20–21 and accompanying text (discussing the directors’
role in sales and mergers).
14. See infra notes 62–64 and accompanying text (discussing the
shareholders’ role in sales and mergers).
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attempts to preserve their gatekeeping role in the face of hostile
tender offers and directors’ attempts to limit the shareholders’
effective voice in approving the sale or combination of their
corporation. Revlon arose in the overlap between these two
situations: Revlon’s directors sought to preserve their
gatekeeping role over the sale of Revlon by supporting a “white
knight” instead of a hostile bidder acquiring the corporation and
did so through tactics that constrained the ability of Revlon’s
shareholders to decline the bid preferred by Revlon’s board.15
Hence, in order to understand Revlon we must examine both
defenses to hostile tender offers (including Delaware’s response in
Unocal), as well as efforts by directors to circumvent the
requirement of shareholder approval for the sale or combination
of their corporation (“shotgun corporate marriages”).
A. Defenses to Hostile Tender Offers
1. The Order of Battle
Acquisitions of corporations over the opposition of the
targeted corporation’s directors (hostile takeovers) exist by virtue
of a discontinuity in corporate law. Broadly speaking, there are
three primary ways in which to structure the purchase of a
business conducted by a corporation:16 the individual or company
seeking to acquire the target corporation’s business can have
itself (if the acquirer is a corporation), or a corporation controlled
by the acquirer, merge with the target corporation;17 the acquirer
can purchase substantially all of the assets of the target
corporation;18 or the acquirer can purchase most or all of the
15. See infra notes 122–28 and accompanying text (describing the facts of
Revlon).
16. See, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 1008–16 (4th ed.
2008) (describing and comparing the three primary methods of conducting an
acquisition).
17. In a statutory merger, two corporations become one, with this surviving
corporation inheriting all of the assets and debts of both merging companies and
with the shareholders of the two merging companies receiving shares in the
surviving corporation or other consideration as provided by the merger
agreement. See id. at 1008, 1028, 1035 (explaining the effect of a statutory
merger).
18. The corporation purchasing the assets of another corporation may also
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stock owned by the existing shareholders of the target
corporation (thereby becoming the majority or sole shareholder of
the target corporation).19
Corporation statutes, including Delaware’s, require the
target corporation’s board of directors to approve either a
merger20 or a sale of substantially all of the target’s assets21
before submitting the merger or sale to a shareholder vote.22 This
means that the target’s board of directors performs a gatekeeping
function; without the board’s approval there can be no merger or
sale of substantially all assets. The board’s power, however, turns
out to be based upon something of a Maginot Line, for corporate
law contains a gap in the board’s gatekeeping role. An acquirer
agree to assume the debts of the selling corporation, thereby ending up at the
same place as if the two corporations merged. See id. at 1012 (noting that the
purchaser often assumes a portion of the target’s liabilities). If the corporation
selling its assets thereafter dissolves and distributes the stock in the purchaser
or other consideration it received in the sale among its shareholders, the
shareholders of both corporations end up in the same position as they would if
the purchasing and selling corporations had merged. See id. (“If the parties
undertake these two additional steps, the result of a sales transaction largely
parallels a statutory merger . . . .”).
19. While the acquirer can operate the target as a subsidiary after
acquiring a majority of the target’s outstanding stock, if the acquirer desires
100% ownership, or direct access to the target’s assets, the acquirer may push
through a merger with the target after the acquirer has obtained a majority of
the target’s outstanding voting stock, thereby ending up with the same end
result as if the corporations had merged to start with. See id. at 1014 (“The
purchaser can then either run the target as a subsidiary, or liquidate it, thereby
achieving the same result as a merger.”). A party might also seek control over a
corporation by persuading other shareholders to elect one and one’s allies to the
board (a proxy contest in a public corporation). See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, A
Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CALIF. L.
REV. 1071, 1075 (1990) (describing such contests as an alternative to hostile
takeovers for replacing management). This may achieve control, but not the
economic benefits of ownership, and so is not functionally equivalent to the
three primary modes of corporate acquisitions.
20. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (2011) (requiring the board to
adopt a resolution approving the merger); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.04(a)
(1984) (“The plan of merger or share exchange must be adopted by the board of
directors.”).
21. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (stating that directors may sell
substantially all assets upon terms the directors decide, subject to approval by
the shareholders); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 12.02(b) (same).
22. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251(c), 271(a) (requiring that a
proposed merger or sale of the company’s assets must be approved by a
shareholder vote); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.04(b), 12.02(a) (same).
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can seek to purchase most or all of the target corporation’s
outstanding shares directly from the target’s existing
stockholders without any approval from—and, indeed, over the
opposition of—the target’s board of directors.23 Normally, such a
purchase takes place through a tender offer.24
Boards of target companies and their advisors have
developed a variety of strategies for reasserting the board’s
gatekeeping function even when dealing with a tender offer.25
These strategies—probably the most effective and common of
which is the so-called ‘‘poison pill’’26—work by creating various
23. See, e.g., Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 95 (Del.
Ch. 2011) (“[U]nder [Delaware statutory law], board approval and
recommendation is required before stockholders have the opportunity to vote on
or even consider a merger proposal, while traditionally the board has been given
no statutory role in responding to a public tender offer.”).
24. The acquirer might seek to buy shares through open market purchases
as individual stockholders decide to sell their shares through the stock
exchange. Waiting around for stockholders to call their brokers and sell through
the stock exchange, however, tends not to be a very efficient way of obtaining a
majority of the outstanding shares.
25. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 192–208
(2d ed. 2009) (describing these strategies).
26. Over the years, the poison pill has mutated (like a virus) and now
comes in a variety of forms. See id. at 196–202 (describing the evolution of the
poison pill). Essentially, the poison pill consists of certain rights that attach to
various types of securities (such as preferred stock, warrants to purchase
preferred stock, or convertible debt instruments). See id. at 196 (“Poison pills
take a wide variety of forms, but today most are based on the class of security
known as a right.”). The corporation can issue these securities as an in-kind
dividend to its shareholders. See id. (noting that the first poison pill was issued
to shareholders as a special dividend). In fact, the securities typically possess
little rights to control or distribution of income and, except in the hostile
takeover context, are largely worthless. See id. at 197 (noting that poison pill
rights are typically “priced so that exercise of the option would be economically
irrational”). Instead, their key feature is the existence of one or more rights that
trigger upon an acquirer purchasing a certain percentage of the target
corporation’s outstanding shares. See id. at 196–97 (describing how the exercise
of these rights act to make the acquisition of the target corporation less
attractive). These rights, which are commonly referred to as “flip-over” and ‘‘flipin’’ provisions, are the poison in the poison pill. See id. at 197, 199 (explaining
how flip-over and flip-in provisions operate). In the event an acquirer purchases
the triggering percentage of shares in the target, such provisions may allow the
holder of the security to purchase the acquirer’s common stock at a substantial
discount if the acquirer merges with the target, or to purchase stock or other
securities of the target at a substantial discount—either of which is very
undesirable from the standpoint of an acquirer. See id. at 197 (explaining how
activation of the poison pill would deter an acquisition). In addition to the poison
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barriers that deter a hostile tender offer. Commonly, cooperation
by the target’s pre-tender offer board can effectively disarm a
poison pill or other takeover defense. In this manner, such
takeover defenses reinsert the target’s board into a gatekeeping
role.
2. Delaware’s Doctrinal Response
a. Framing the Issues
In deciding how to respond to defenses against hostile tender
offers, the Delaware courts faced two fundamental questions:
(1) is the limit on takeover defenses one of directors’ authority or
of their duty; and (2) if the limit is duty, by what standard does
the court review whether directors breached their duty.
The first question frames the issue as one of the relative
power of directors and shareholders and asks whether instituting
defenses to hostile tender offers exceeds the directors’ authority.
Prior to Unocal, a number of leading academics argued that
courts should hold that directors lack authority to institute
defenses against hostile tender offers.27 A simplistic argument for
this position would be that the corporation statute empowers the
board to manage the corporation28—something shareholders in a
public corporation cannot do for themselves—not to take actions
that simply interfere with the ability of shareholders to sell their
own stock. A broader policy oriented argument involves the
utility of hostile tender offers. Although the gap in the board’s
gatekeeping role regarding mergers and acquisitions is the result
of an evolutionary accident rather than the product of an
pill rights, the poison pill security typically is subject to an important
redemption provision. This provision empowers the board of the target to
redeem the security at a modest price prior to the triggering event. See id. at
199–200 (discussing when the board may want to redeem the poison pill
security).
27. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of
a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161,
1164 (1981) (“[C]urrent legal rules allowing the target’s management to engage
in defensive tactics in response to a tender offer decrease shareholders’
welfare.”).
28. See supra note 11 (citing statutes that grant directors the power to
manage the corporation).
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intelligent design,29 evolutionary accidents often produce
advantages. In this instance, many academics have argued that
hostile tender offers play a useful role in ensuring that corporate
boards act in the best interest of the corporation and its
shareholders by creating a practical mechanism for replacing
incompetent or disloyal boards.30 Given this role for hostile tender
29. The ability of shareholders to freely transfer their stock has been a
feature of corporate law ever since the organizers of the Dutch United East
India Company invented this as a solution to the liquidity demands of investors
who were tired of waiting for the end of multi-year voyages in order to see any
money. See, e.g., Ron Harris, The Formation of the East India Company as a
Cooperation-Enhancing Organization 31–32 (Tel Aviv Univ., Working Paper,
Dec. 2005),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=874406
(describing the invention of transferable shares). At the same time, these
earliest business corporations were inheriting from merchant guilds and other
institutions the norm of governance by an elected board. See, e.g., Franklin A.
Gevurtz, The Political and Historical Origins of the Corporate Board of
Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 115–26 (2004) (explaining how corporations
adopted the idea of board governance from these institutions). Over time, the
franchise changed from one shareholder, one vote to voting in proportion to one’s
shares. Id. at 121. Combining free transferability, an elected board, and voting
in proportion to stock creates the basis for a single person to purchase a
majority of voting shares and pick the board without having negotiated with the
prior board—in other words, to launch a hostile takeover.
30. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112–13 (1965) (explaining how takeovers ensure
managerial efficiency). Under this view, the shareholder franchise, by allowing
shareholders to vote out incompetent or dishonest directors, exists as
mechanism for insuring directors make wealth maximizing decisions. See, e.g.,
Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26
J.L. & ECON. 301, 309–11 (1983) (noting that an elected board exists to monitor
management on behalf of shareholders, who have the best incentives for
efficient decisions but are too numerous to monitor management themselves).
But see Gevurtz, supra note 29, at 170–72 (arguing that a more historically
accurate view of the shareholder franchise suggests that its purpose is to bestow
democratic legitimacy upon those who come to control organizations with
potentially huge economic power). Freely transferable shares, however, can
undermine the accountability function of the franchise by encouraging
dissatisfied shareholders to sell out rather than engage in electoral contests.
See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 560
(6th ed. 2004) (describing the causes of rational apathy). The ability of parties to
purchase a majority of shares and elect a new board restores the accountability
that is otherwise undermined by the apathy induced by freely transferable
shares and thus, under this view, returns proper balance to the corporate
universe. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The
Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 841–45
(1981) (arguing that a “market for corporate control” is important in keeping
management accountable, and that the tender offer is the most effective
mechanism by which that market operates).
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offers, the argument concludes, directors should not have the
authority to block such offers and thereby stand in the way of their
removal.31 Other writers have argued that the superior evolutionary
development is the centralization of power in the corporate board—
manifested here by the board’s statutory gatekeeping role in
mergers and asset sales.32 The argument for this view is that the
board has an inherent advantage over scattered shareholders, who
face collective action problems, when dealing with a sale of the
entire company.33 Accordingly, this view concludes that directors
should have the authority to use defensive tactics in order to claim a
gatekeeping role even over tender offers.34
Assuming the board possesses the authority to engage in
takeover defenses, the question then becomes what sort of standard
courts will apply when reviewing whether the directors breached
their duty to advance the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders in undertaking such defenses in a particular case.
Normally, courts apply the business judgment rule when dealing
with challenges by disgruntled shareholders to decisions by
corporate boards.35 While disagreement and doubt exists as to what
exact standard the business judgment rule entails,36 there is general
agreement that the standard calls for a greater level of deference to
directors than to persons in other contexts.37 Hence, few courts in
applying the business judgment rule would hold directors liable for

31. See Gilson, supra note 30, at 845–47 (arguing that defensive tactics
against tender offers reduces the offers’ effectiveness as a means to control
management discretion).
32. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, at 57 (arguing that the board,
rather than shareholders, is in the best position to make decisions regarding a
merger).
33. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35
BUS. LAW. 101, 113–14 (1979) (discussing why shareholders will accept tender
offers even when not in their interest).
34. See id. at 115 (“There is no reason to remove the decision on a takeover
from the reasonable business judgment of the directors.”).
35. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (applying the
business judgment rule).
36. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless
Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 289–303 (1994)
(discussing different interpretations of the rule).
37. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (comparing the
standard of care for corporate directors to that of a negligent automobile driver).
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their decision simply because the decision was unreasonable.38
Delaware courts have equated the standard under the business
judgment rule with gross negligence.39 The principal exception to
application of the business judgment rule to a decision by the board
occurs when the decision involves a conflict of interest for some or
all board members or parties controlling board members.40 In this
event, unless shareholders or directors without a conflict vote to
approve the transaction after full disclosure, courts apply a fairness
test (called in Delaware the “intrinsic fairness” test).41 Under this
test, proponents of the transaction must prove to a skeptical court
that the transaction was fair42—essentially that the corporation
received as good a deal as it would have if dealing with a stranger.43
This bifurcated approach reflects a policy that the degree of judicial
scrutiny over board decisions should depend upon the extent that
one can trust the directors to act for the right motives (even if not
always with the best results).44
The standard that courts should apply to takeover defenses is
not obvious. While some takeover defenses (such as a golden
parachute45 or supporting a management buyout46 when either
38. See id. (“[L]iability is rarely imposed upon corporate directors or
officers simply for bad judgment . . . .”).
39. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985),
overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009)
(noting that the business judgment rule applies a standard of gross negligence).
40. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721 (Del. 1971)
(applying a different standard in the case of alleged self-dealing).
41. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2011) (providing the fairness
test as an alternative to non-interested director or shareholder approval).
42. See, e.g., Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 719–20 (“The standard of intrinsic
fairness involves both a high degree of fairness and a shift in the burden of
proof.”).
43. See, e.g., Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 225 (Del. 1976) (finding
that intrinsic fairness test was satisfied because the transaction would have
been carried out by another corporation in the subject corporation’s position).
44. See, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 341–42 (2d ed. 2010)
(explaining that the business judgment rule should only apply in instances
where directors can be trusted to act in the company’s best interest, which is not
the case in conflict-of-interest transactions).
45. In a golden parachute, senior executives, some of whom may be on the
board, receive compensation from the corporation if terminated following a
takeover. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, at 25 (defining “golden
parachute”).
46. In a management buyout, an entity owned at least in part by senior
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includes members of the board) constitute traditional conflict-ofinterest transactions between the corporation and its directors,
most takeover defensives, such as a poison pill, do not.47 On the
other hand, a takeover presumably will result in the replacement
of the current directors, which is something that most directors
have both a financial and a psychological interest to avoid. Hence,
in opposing a hostile takeover, directors have what one might call
a positional conflict of interest (the interest in retaining their
positions even at the shareholders’ expense).48 Still, all sorts of
decisions, at least indirectly, impact the directors’ retention of
control over the corporation.49 Hence, courts may understandably
be reluctant to apply the rigorous scrutiny of fairness review to
board decisions simply because the decisions impact the directors’
continued control.
b. Unocal
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,50 the Delaware
Supreme Court answered these two fundamental questions about
defenses to hostile tender offers, thereby establishing the law of
takeover defenses for most of the largest companies in the United
States.51 Unocal arose out of a hostile tender offer made by Mesa
Petroleum, a company controlled by corporate raider T. Boone
Pickens, for Unocal.52 The case presented a particularly
executives, some of whom may be on the board, purchases the corporation. See
id. (defining “management buyout”).
47. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957–58
(Del. 1985) (rejecting the argument that the directors, in responding to a hostile
tender offer by deciding to have their corporation make a competing offer to
repurchase its own shares, had a conflict of interest because the directors also
owned shares they could sell back to the corporation).
48. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1461, 1472 (1989) (coining the term).
49. For example, producing good corporate results will decrease the
interest of shareholders in replacing the current directors.
50. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
51. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State
Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1775, 1810 (2002) (noting that
over half of all public companies that incorporate in the United States
incorporate in Delaware).
52. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949 n.1.
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sympathetic set of facts for board intervention. Mesa had
undertaken a textbook example of a coercive tender offer.
Specifically, Mesa offered to buy enough shares in Unocal to give
Mesa majority ownership of Unocal, while at the same time
informing Unocal’s shareholders that once Mesa acquired a
majority of Unocal shares, Mesa would use its control to push
through a merger in which the remaining Unocal shareholders
would receive junk (below investment grade) bonds in exchange
for their stock.53 Under these circumstances, Unocal shareholders
who did not find Mesa’s price attractive might nevertheless
accept its offer for fear of being left in the minority group who
only received junk bonds, an example of the “prisoners’ dilemma”
at work.54 In response, Unocal’s board adopted a resolution
stating that Unocal would purchase the minority shares not sold
to Mesa at a price considerably higher than Mesa offered.55
Funding this repurchase would leave Unocal heavily in debt and
a much less desirable acquisition for Mesa, who sued to challenge
the action.56
Looking first at the question of authority, the Delaware
Supreme Court in Unocal confirmed that directors have the
power to engage in defenses to hostile tender offers.57 By doing so,
the court framed Delaware takeover jurisprudence as not about
whether directors have usurped power belonging to the
shareholders, but rather as about whether directors, in the
exercise of their unquestioned power, have breached their
fiduciary duty to advance the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders. A decade later, the Delaware Supreme Court
developed second thoughts about this duty, not power,
framework—at least in extreme cases in which directors have
deployed defenses that preclude any possibility of a hostile
acquisition.58 The result, for better or for worse, is to create a sort
53. See id. at 949–50.
54. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 30, at 859–61 (explaining the prisoners’
dilemma in tender offers).
55. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949–51.
56. Id. at 950.
57. See id. at 953–54 (explaining that the board can engage in tender offer
defenses, “provided the directors have not acted out of a sole or primary purpose
to entrench themselves in office.”).
58. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1386–88 (Del. 1995)
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of schizophrenic quality in Delaware takeover jurisprudence; but
this reframing of the issue in takeovers to reintroduce concerns
over power, not just duty, post-dates Revlon and so has limited
impact upon our story.
Having decided that the issue is fiduciary duty, not power,
the Unocal court then needed to address the standard it would
apply in reviewing whether the directors breached their duty
through the self-tender. To deal with the positional conflict of
interest confronting directors faced with a hostile tender offer,
the court in Unocal decided to establish an intermediate level of
scrutiny between the intrinsic fairness test and the business
judgment rule. Specifically, the court set out a two-part test to
review directors’ decisions to employ takeover defenses.59 Under
the first part of the Unocal test, the directors must prove that
they possessed reasonable grounds for believing a threat to
corporate policy and effectiveness existed.60 The second part of
the test requires that the defensive measure used be reasonable
in relation to the threat posed.61 This sort of reasonableness test
(explaining that defenses which are coercive or preclusive in cramming down
upon the shareholders a board sponsored alternative or precluding any hostile
tender offer violate Unocal’s requirement that defenses be proportionate).
59. See Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955–56 (Del. 1985)
(establishing the test).
60. See id. at 955 (“[D]irectors must show that they had reasonable grounds
for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because
of another person’s stock ownership.”).
61. See id. (“If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the
business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”).
The court was on solid ground in finding Mesa’s coercive tender offer provided
Unocal’s directors with reasonable grounds for taking action. The court was
sloppier in finding Unocal’s self-tender was proportionate to the threat. The
problem was that the self-tender was at a significantly higher price than Mesa’s
tender offer. As a result, the impact went well beyond removing the prisoners’
dilemma (which matching Mesa’s price would have achieved) and created a
reverse incentive to not tender to Mesa and hold out for the higher price from
Unocal. Mesa could have responded by matching or exceeding Unocal’s price—
which would have restored the incentive for Unocal’s shareholders to tender to
Mesa—but the court never asked whether Unocal’s offer was a realistic price
that Unocal’s directors might have hoped to obtain from Mesa or so out of the
ballpark that the directors were simply trying to chase Mesa away. In fact, the
directors seem to have set the self-tender price well above the price that
Unocal’s investment bankers identified as what the shareholders should get
from a sale of 100% of the company’s stock. See id. at 950 (“[Banker] opined that
the minimum cash value that could be expected from a sale or orderly
liquidation for 100% of Unocal’s stock was in excess of $60 per share [compared
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as to both ends sought and means used is more demanding than
the business judgment rule (absence of gross negligence) but is
not as demanding as the intrinsic fairness test (convincing the
court that the corporation got a good deal).
B. Shotgun Corporate Marriages
1. Circumventing Shareholder Consent to Mergers and Sales of
Corporations
The three primary modes of corporate acquisition all
seemingly require consent of the target company’s shareholders.
Corporation statutes, including Delaware’s, require a vote of
approval by a corporation’s shareholders for a sale of
substantially all of the company’s assets62 and, with limited
exceptions, for a merger of the corporation.63 While corporation
statutes, including Delaware’s, do not require a formal vote by
shareholders to accept a tender offer, shareholders “vote with
their feet” insofar as the failure of enough shareholders to sell
renders the tender offer unsuccessful.64 Yet, just as the tender
offer allows buyers and shareholders to circumvent the board’s
gatekeeping role with respect to corporate mergers and sales,
techniques exist that allow the board to circumvent the
shareholders’ veto over mergers and sales.
a. Avoiding Consent Requirements
Corporate laws contain various gaps in their requirement for
shareholder consent to corporate combinations and sales.
Directors can exploit these gaps to avoid putting a corporate
combination or sale to a shareholder vote.
to $72 per share offered by Unocal’s board].”).
62. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (2011) (requiring that any such
sale be authorized by a resolution adopted by shareholder vote); MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 12.02(a) (1984) (same).
63. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (requiring that a proposed
merger agreement be submitted to a shareholder vote); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 11.04(b) (same).
64. GEVURTZ, supra note 16, at 1015.
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To begin with, corporation statutes, including Delaware’s,
typically do not require a vote by the shareholders of the
acquiring corporation either to purchase substantially all of the
assets of another corporation or to make a tender offer for
another corporation’s outstanding shares.65 At first glance, this
seems irrelevant to the requirement of shareholder approval in
order to sell the shareholders’ corporation. The problem, however,
is that the acquiring corporation in a sale of assets or tender offer
does not, in fact, need to be the company that is the buyer as one
normally thinks of who is buying whom. Specifically, the
corporation whose owners end up acquiring a majority of the
stock in the company emerging from the transaction—in other
words, the party one would normally think of as the purchaser—
could actually be the company selling all of its of assets or whose
owners sell their stock. This happens if the company purchasing
all of another company’s assets or purchasing another company’s
outstanding stock pays by issuing shares sufficient to give the
shareholders on the so-called seller’s side a majority ownership of
the so-called purchasing company.66 For evident reason this is
known as an upside-down transaction.
Triangular transactions also allow planners to avoid
requirements for a shareholder vote. In a triangular merger, a
subsidiary engages in the merger. In this instance, the
shareholder that must approve the merger is the parent company
of the merging subsidiary.67 This means that the decision lies
with the parent corporation’s board, which will decide how the
parent votes the shares it owns in the subsidiary, rather than the
shareholders of the parent. This can be true even though the
parent might issue sufficient stock in itself to give the other side’s
65. See id. at 1013, 1014 (noting the lack of shareholder voting rights in
these instances).
66. For example, in Farris v. Glen-Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958), the
corporation purchasing all the assets of the so-called selling corporation paid by
issuing over three and a half million shares at a time when it had less two and a
half million shares outstanding, with the result that, after the corporation
which sold its assets dissolved and distributed the shares it received in the sale
to its stockholders, the former stockholders of the so-called selling corporation
ended up with most of the shares in the so-called buyer. See id. at 27 (describing
the assets-for-shares exchange).
67. See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 16, at 1021 (explaining the mechanics of
a triangular merger).
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shareholder(s) control over the emerging combination, again
depriving the shareholders on what one would normally view to
be the seller’s side of any vote.68
Triangular transactions, asset sales, and tender offers also
can deprive at least one side’s shareholders of a vote on a socalled merger of equals. The basic scheme of corporate law not
only views the target corporation’s shareholders as entitled to
vote on an acquisition of their company but also views both sides’
shareholders as entitled to vote on a marriage between two
operating companies in which the combination significantly
impacts the shareholders in both companies.69 Parties, however,
can structure such a merger of equals as a triangular merger,
sale of assets, or purchase of stock, thereby depriving one side’s
shareholders of a vote on the transaction.70
One caveat to this discussion is that issuing additional
shares in upside-down and triangular transactions might demand
a shareholder vote. If the certificate of incorporation did not
authorize the company to issue the number of shares called for by
the deal, shareholders would need to vote to amend the
certificate.71 Stock exchange rules also require listed companies
to put large issuances of stock to a shareholder vote.72 On the
68. As discussed infra in notes 144–52 and the accompanying text, the
original structure for the famous Time–Warner merger involved a merger of
Warner with a Time subsidiary in which Time would have issued enough shares
to the former Warner shareholders to give the former Warner shareholders a
majority of Time’s outstanding shares after the merger. Nevertheless, the
merger provision in Delaware’s corporation statute did not require Time’s
shareholders to approve this proposed merger.
69. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c), (f) (2011) (requiring
shareholder approval for both corporations in a merger but noting that
shareholders do not need to approve a merger that does not significantly change
their rights by amending the certificate, exchanging their shares, or issuing a
significant amount of additional shares).
70. See, e.g., Farris, 143 A.2d at 27 (noting that the sale of assets involved a
major change in the rights of shareholders of the purchasing corporation).
71. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (“The holders of the
outstanding shares of a class shall be entitled to vote as a class upon a proposed
amendment . . . if the amendment would increase or decrease the aggregate
number of shares of such class . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03(b) (1984)
(requiring that any amendment to the articles of incorporation be approved by
the shareholders).
72. See N.Y. Stock Exch., Listed Company Manual § 312.03(c) (2013),
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp%
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other hand, if the certificate of incorporation provides for a large
number of authorized but not yet issued shares and if a
corporation is content to delist its stock, then these requirements
for a shareholder vote do not come into play.
b. Coercing Consent
In lieu of avoiding a shareholder vote, directors may employ
tactics to pressure the shareholders into voting in favor of a board
supported sale or combination. To the extent that directors can
chase away other bidders for the company through takeover
defenses, the directors can push the shareholders to vote in favor
of the board supported transaction as the only choice presented.
Moreover, to the extent that directors agree to terms that will
cause detrimental effects upon the corporation if its shareholders
vote the sale or combination down, the directors can discourage
shareholders from voting in favor of continuing the status quo.
Various deal protection devices, such as termination fees and
lock-up agreements, can pressure shareholders to vote for a board
favored combination both by removing other choices and by
penalizing the shareholders for voting a deal down.73 A
termination fee paid to the favored merger partner if the
shareholders vote down the board proposed merger provides the
simplest illustration. A termination fee large enough that its
payment would impact negatively the value of the corporation
makes the corporation no longer as attractive a target to other
bidders. It also penalizes the shareholders by making their
corporation less valuable if they vote down the deal. A lock-up
under which the board agrees to sell desirable assets of the
corporation (the crown jewels) cheaply to the favored bidder in
the event the shareholders vote down the board proposed
combination has the same two impacts but typically with far
greater magnitude. Although they do not decrease the value of
5F1%5F4%5F11%5F1&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm%2Dsections%2F
(last visited Sept. 21, 2013) (explaining where shareholder approval is necessary
for stock distribution) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
73. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and
Lock-ups in Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239, 287–88
(1990) (analyzing the impact of asset and stock lock-up agreements).
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the target corporation, lock-up agreements under which the board
will sell stock cheaply to the favored bidder dilute the value of the
remaining shares if the favored combination does not occur. Once
again, the impact is to discourage competing bids or a negative
vote.74 The larger the termination fee or lock-up, the greater the
impact. Eventually the impact reaches a point at which no other
bidder may come forward and rational shareholders would vote
for a deal they would otherwise reject simply in order to avoid the
penalty.
2. Delaware’s Doctrinal Response
The policy issues raised by shotgun corporate marriages are
complex—perhaps more so than the issues raised by takeover
defenses—and, as a result, the Delaware Supreme Court’s
response is something of a muddle. While a full exploration of
this topic must await another article, an overview of these issues
and the Delaware Supreme Court’s response is necessary to
understand Revlon because Revlon sits in the middle of this
muddle.
a. Framing the Issues
As with defenses to hostile tender offers, attempts to avoid or
coerce shareholder consent force courts to decide whether the
issue is authority (have directors exceeded their authority in
acting without a vote by shareholders who were not subject to
coercion?) or duty (have directors’ breached their duty to advance
the interests of the shareholders and the corporation?); and, if the
issue is duty, by what standard does the court review whether
directors breached their duty? Complicating the answers here,
however, is the lack of any consensus on what purpose
shareholder consent serves, as well as the fact that deal

74. Selling stock cheaply to the favored buyer before the shareholders act
on the proposed transaction (as opposed to simply giving the favored buyer the
option to purchase stock cheaply if the shareholders reject the deal) also gives
the favored buyer a leg-up on gaining favorable shareholder action.
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protection devices may have other impacts besides coercing
shareholder consent.
The requirement for shareholder consent to mergers and
sales of assets is again a product of evolution, in this instance
from an era in which corporate laws applied partnership and
contract based ideas that called for the consent of all partners or
parties to the contract to any alternations of the basic deal.75
Pressure to remove barriers to corporate mergers and
acquisitions led to eliminating the requirement that all
shareholders consent and replacing it with supermajority and
eventually majority vote requirements76 but without an evident
rethinking of why the law required any shareholder vote at all.
Scholars have asserted various rationales for the continuing
viability of requiring a shareholder vote to approve mergers and
sales of substantially all assets. Melvin Eisenberg argues that it
reflects a difference in expertise between directors and
shareholders.77 Directors have an advantage in expertise when it
comes to business decisions (e.g., build a plant, discontinue a
product line). Shareholders, however, have as much expertise as
directors when it comes to broad investment decisions—they buy
and sell stock in their company. Frank Easterbrook and Daniel
Fischel argue that it reflects the importance of the decision
involved. Their notion is that shareholders will not pay much
attention to ordinary corporate decisions but will give thoughtful
consideration to critical decisions such as whether to merge.78 By
75. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, The Control and Conflict of Interest Voting
Systems, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (1992) (describing the contractual theory of
shareholder consent).
76. See id. at 10 (noting that the unanimous consent requirement created
an obstacle to corporate expansion and acquisitions). To substitute for
unanimous consent, corporate laws established appraisal rights allowing
dissenting shareholders to cash out. See, e.g., Bayless Manning, The
Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223,
228–29 (1962) (explaining how appraisal rights provided an alternative to the
unanimous consent rule).
77. MELVIN EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 14–16 (1976)
(creating a distinction between decisions that directors are more qualified to
make and those that are more suitable for shareholders).
78. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate
Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 416 (1983) (“[T]he possibility of large gain or loss in
these transactions because of their size is sufficient to overcome the collective
action problems . . . that would make voting on ordinary business decisions
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contrast, Ronald Gilson and Bernard Black suggest that it is a
response to the poor incentives directors may have in a final
period situation.79 Specifically, because directors will presumably
lose their positions following a sale of substantially all assets and
potentially lose their positions following a merger, directors lose
their incentive to avoid actions prejudicial to the shareholders in
making these decisions.80 The requirement of shareholder
approval allows the shareholders to protect themselves from
damaging board decisions that may result.
The absence of a consensus on the purpose that shareholder
consent serves—and therefore whether it should exist—makes it
difficult to resolve the power question of when courts should find
that directors impermissibly avoided shareholder consent by
virtue of the manner in which the directors structured the
transaction. Complicating this issue further, courts must ask
whether they should leave this issue to the legislature, which
created the discontinuity in shareholder approval requirements
to begin with.
Deal protection devices, such as lock-ups, raise yet another
policy concern. Although they constrain shareholder voice by
reducing alternatives and potentially penalizing the corporation
if the shareholders vote down the transaction, proponents argue
that lock-ups also may be the necessary price to attract either an
initial or a topping bid.81 In other words, prospective buyers may
not wish to invest the time and energy bidding on a company
without some consolation prize should their deal not go through.
Actually, however, it is misleading to suggest that the board must
meaningless.”).
79. See RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 720–21 (2d ed. 1995) (explaining that directors have
less incentive to avoid harmful actions in “final period” transactions because
they cannot be penalized in subsequent transactions).
80. See id. (“In the context of an acquisition nothing stops target
management from selling out the shareholders in return for side payments from
the acquiring company because target management, by definition, will no longer
be subject to the constraints of the product, capital and control markets after
the acquisition.”).
81. See, e.g., Barbara A. Koza, Note, Corporations—Mergers—“Lock-Up”
Enjoined Under Section 14(e) of Securities Exchange Act—Mobil Corp. v.
Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), 12 SETON HALL L. REV. 881, 892
(1982) (stating that lock-up agreements further the interests of shareholders by
ensuring more beneficial “white knight” mergers).
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provide substantial consideration just to get a bid. As illustrated
by the facts in Revlon itself, proposed lock-ups come as part of a
package with a bid.82 Indeed, a board would be crazy (and lose the
protection of the business judgment rule83) if it were to agree to a
lock-up imposing substantial potential cost on the corporation
without knowing what the bid is. Hence, the costs incurred by the
bidder in preparing the bid are sunk costs and gone if the board
rejects the bid (with the lock-up).84
In fact, lock-ups, for the most part, only exist because
corporate law limits the board’s authority to merge or sell the
company without shareholder approval. This is not to say that
lock-ups are always, or even normally, efforts to coerce
shareholder acceptance of the transaction approved by the board.
Rather, it is to say that there generally would be no need for a
lock-up if the board had the authority to enter a binding contract
to merge or sell the corporation without shareholder approval.
After all, if the board had such authority, then the bidder could
have a binding contract to merge or buy the company, and not
just some assets or stock, in order to ensure that the bidder gets
something for its efforts.85 The fact that lock-ups exist because of
82. See infra notes 122–28 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of
Revlon).
83. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 887–88 (Del. 1985),
overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009)
(holding directors breached their duty of care in voting without sufficient
information for a merger agreement which sold the company).
84. See, e.g., Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking
Lockups, 103 YALE. L.J. 1739, 1814 (1994) (“[B]y the time a bidder makes its bid
and the target board considers whether to grant a lockup in exchange, most of
the costs are already sunk.”).
85. In some cases, antitrust or regulatory barriers might prevent
completion of a merger or sale, albeit this seems to be a declining risk in the
current antitrust era. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 544, 608 (4th ed. 2011)
(noting that today’s antitrust enforcers and courts view mergers as less of a
competitive threat than they did in the past). Still, it is not clear why the risk of
uncompensated costs in events that are beyond the target corporation’s control
should fall entirely on the target rather than on both sides. Beyond regulatory
barriers, there remains the danger that the board might have the corporation
breach the contract to merge or sell the company if a better bid comes along. For
this reason, a contract might provide liquidated damages, and a cash
termination fee might serve the same function. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note
73, at 245–46 (explaining the use of these provisions). On the other hand, a lockup option to sell assets or stock is still a contract, and the board might always
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the limitation on the board’s authority to sell the company
without shareholder approval, in turn, raises the question of
whether the lock-up, itself, should be viewed as beyond the
board’s authority. Put in terms of a simple principal/agent model,
would a principal, who demands that an agent check back with
the principal before entering a contract, wish to give the agent
authority to pay the third party something if it turns out that the
principal decides that the agent brought back a poor offer?
Indeed, is a third party who would demand such a fee not
signaling to the principal a lack of confidence in the offer
presented to the agent?
One difference, however, with shareholder approval from this
simple principal/agent model is the time delay entailed in
obtaining a shareholder vote in a public corporation. This might
suggest a rationale for lock-ups as the consideration for
shareholders obtaining a several month long option contract.86 If
the rationale for lock-ups is to provide an option contract for
shareholders, then presumably the lock-up should not be so large
as to destroy the value of the option. In other words, if the lock-up
is large enough to chase away any higher bidders and pressure
shareholders into voting for the transaction simply to avoid
triggering the lock-up, then the lock-up gains nothing of value by
buying time for the shareholders. Some scholars have attempted
to construct tests that would identify lock-ups having such
foreclosing impact.87 Whether these tests, in fact, differentiate
good and bad lock-ups and whether adequate information exists
in the real world to execute these tests are open questions.88
breach the lock-up contract if a better bid comes along. This would still leave
litigation necessary to figure out expectation damages. Hence, asset or stock
lock-ups are not equivalent to liquidated damages.
86. See, e.g., Smith v. Pritzker, No. 6342, 1982 WL 8774, at *3 (Del. Ch.
July 6, 1982) (describing the lock-up as compensation to the bidder for
essentially providing a put option).
87. See Bainbridge, supra note 73, at 323–32 (proposing bright-line cutoff
at 10% of the transaction value); Ian Ayres, Analyzing Stock Lock-Ups: Do
Target Treasury Sales Foreclose or Facilitate Takeover Auctions?, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 682, 704–09 (1990) (suggesting an approach that compares whether the
bidder would profit more from a takeover or from tendering treasury shares to
another bidder).
88. See Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 84, at 1768–69, 1774–84 (calling
Ayres and Bainbridge’s proposals into question).
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Turning from power to duty, courts must once again decide
what standard they will employ in reviewing a particular board
decision to see if the board breached its duty to advance the
interest of the corporation and the shareholders. This turns out to
be even more complicated in shotgun corporate marriages than
when dealing with tender offer defenses. For one thing, it is less
clear how circumventing shareholder consent fits within the
traditional rubric under which the degree of judicial scrutiny
depends upon whether one can trust directors to act for proper
motives. In the context of takeover defenses, the concern raised
by the directors’ positional conflict of interest fits nicely into this
rubric—even if the positional conflict may call for greater nuance
than the traditional bifurcated approach of extreme deference or
extreme scrutiny. By contrast, the existence of self-interest is less
apparent if all that is going on is that the directors are
determined to have their way and not allow the shareholders to
block a merger or sale which the directors view to be in the best
interests of the company or the shareholders.
As the events in Revlon itself illustrate, however, this
conclusion becomes confused because of the overlap between
takeover defenses and shotgun corporate marriages. The takeover
defenses discussed earlier deter and stall hostile tender offers but
might not be able to prevent the acquisition of a widely held
corporation over the board’s objection no matter how determined
and patient the acquirer.89 Hence, the only way to prevent the
acquisition of a highly attractive target corporation by an
undesired (from the standpoint of the target’s board) suitor might
be to find another buyer (a so-called white knight).90 Of course, it
is not enough simply to locate a white knight; the target’s board
must both entice the white knight to enter the fray and ensure
the white knight prevails in the contest. Agreeing to lock-ups or
other deal protection devices for the white knight potentially
89. For example, to deal with a poison pill, an acquirer may launch a proxy
contest coupled with a hostile tender offer conditioned on the board’s redeeming
the pill. The idea is to persuade the existing shareholders to vote in directors
friendly to the acquirer. These new directors will redeem the pill before the
acquirer purchases the number of shares otherwise triggering the poison. See,
e.g., CHOPER, ET AL., supra note 30, at 990 (describing this strategy).
90. See id. at 993 (explaining that if the target’s management fails in its
efforts to defend against a hostile bid, its second best strategy may be an
acquisition by a less threatening bidder—a so-called white knight).
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accomplishes both goals. Yet, corporate combinations occur all the
time without the prompting of a hostile tender offer.91 In this
situation, a significant threat to obtaining shareholder approval
is a better offer from another bidder.92 Hence, tactics, including
lock-ups and other deal protection devices, that deter competing
offers are a major means for assuring shareholder approval of
board favored combinations.93 The end result is to create a
twilight zone in which a board may take the same actions either
to push through a corporate combination in order to defeat an
undesired tender offer or to deter competing tender offers in order
to push through a desired corporate combination. Put in more
colorful language, shotgun corporate marriages can be a defense
to a hostile tender offer, while defenses to a hostile tender offer
can be the shotgun used to force the shareholders to accept a
board desired corporate marriage.
When the board seeks to avoid or coerce shareholder consent
in favor of a white knight brought in as a response to a hostile
tender offer, the positional conflict of interest created by the
pending hostile tender offer seems evident enough—albeit, as
discussed later,94 the positional conflict actually may be less in
the white knight situation than with takeover defenses that
would leave the target independent. The same positional conflict
may exist even if the board searches for a white knight when the
board views the corporation as likely in the near future to attract
a hostile bid, albeit prior to facing the threat from an identifiable
hostile bidder. On the other hand, suppose a board seeks a
combination or sale in the situation in which the board did not
feel there was any particular danger of a hostile tender offer if
the board did not act. In such a situation, where is the positional
conflict? True, the board may employ deal protection devices to
prevent competing bids, which action sounds like it fits in the
tender offer defense world. Yet, in this instance, the motive for
deterring such offers is not to maintain the current directors’
positions but rather to get the board’s way on the transaction.
91. See id. at 992 (noting that most corporate acquisitions are friendly).
92. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 73, at 240–42 (naming potential
obstacles to consummating friendly mergers).
93. See id. at 250 (describing how lock-ups deter competing bids).
94. See infra notes 343–46 and accompanying text (comparing the conflicts
of interest in a white knight situation and a typical takeover defense).
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Does the mere desire to have one’s way regarding a specific
business decision constitute a conflict of interest? If so, the
implications reach far beyond shotgun corporate marriages.95
Beyond the question of self-interest, perhaps there is some
other justification for heightened judicial scrutiny when directors
avoid or coerce shareholder consent to a corporate merger or sale.
The argument would be that the traditional rubric, under which
the degree of judicial scrutiny depends upon the presence or
absence of director self-interest, is not exclusive. Instead,
heightened scrutiny also may be necessary to provide a functional
substitute for shareholder consent that directors avoided or
coerced.
In fact, one might find support for this functional substitute
argument in the structure of statutory provisions, such as Section
144 of Delaware’s General Corporation Law,96 which deals with
director conflict-of-interest transactions. Such provisions allow
either a vote by shareholders or a judicial finding of fairness to
cure the conflict.97 Hence, heightened judicial scrutiny and
shareholder consent act as functional substitutes in addressing
director self-dealing. On the other hand, with director conflict-ofinterest transactions, the law looks for a party one can trust to
review the transaction because we cannot trust the directors.
Both the court and disinterested shareholders constitute someone
we can trust.98 Unless one accepts Professor Gilson’s final period
incentives argument,99 however, the issue is not one of trust when
dealing with directors avoiding or coercing shareholder approval
of mergers and sales. If the issue is not trust, then heightened
judicial scrutiny may not serve as a functional substitute for
shareholder consent. For example, if the purpose of shareholder
95. Cf. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 763 (Del. Ch.
2005) (describing Eisner’s manipulation of the process in order to get his way on
hiring Ovitz).
96. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2011).
97. See id. § 144(a)(2)–(3) (allowing the conflicted transaction to occur if the
conflict is disclosed to shareholders who then approve the deal or if the
transaction is “fair” to the company).
98. See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 44, at 344 (noting that shareholders or
the court can be trusted more to provide a fair review of conflict-of-interest
transactions than interested directors).
99. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (elaborating on the final
period argument).
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consent is to allow the owners control over investment or major
decisions for what is, after all, their company, heightened judicial
scrutiny does not provide a functional substitute any more than it
would if directors simply cancelled the annual election of
directors and ask the court to review whether the current board
has done a good job.
b. The Current Approach
The Delaware Supreme Court has not shown the same
concern found in some other states about actions taken by boards
to avoid putting corporate combinations or sales to a shareholder
vote. Courts in some jurisdictions have attempted to prevent use
of upside-down and triangular transactions to avoid triggering
shareholder rights (such as voting or appraisal rights) that
normally attach to a merger.100 These courts have done so by
labeling such a transaction a de facto merger, which, in turn,
requires the same approval process and calls for the same
shareholder rights as a normal merger.101 By contrast, the
Delaware Supreme Court in Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc.102
rejected any recognition of the de facto merger doctrine when it
comes to shareholder rights in Delaware.103 Instead, the court
held that statutory provisions involving mergers and asset sales
were “of equal dignity,” and if directors employ one to achieve the
same objective without extending the same rights to shareholders
as provided by the other it is not up to the court to interfere.104
Delaware court decisions regarding lock-ups and other deal
protection devices are more complicated. Interestingly, the
Delaware Supreme Court has only obliquely addressed the issue
of whether the statutory requirement that shareholders approve
100. See, e.g., Pratt v. Ballman-Cummings Furniture Co., 495 S.W.2d 509,
510–11 (Ark. 1973) (recognizing that a corporate combination, though not a
merger in fact, may still have the same legal effect as a merger and therefore
should be treated as such).
101. See id. at 510 (noting that a de facto merger confers the same rights on
shareholders as a true merger).
102. 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963).
103. See id. at 125 (applying the sale-of-assets statute, even though the sale
achieved the same result as a merger).
104. Id.
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a merger or sale of assets also limits the board’s authority to
agree to lock-ups or other deal protection devices without
shareholder approval. Courts outside of Delaware have disagreed
on this question.105 While never expressly entering this fray, the
fact that the Delaware Supreme Court has repeatedly reviewed
whether directors breached their fiduciary duty in agreeing to
individual lock-ups and deal protection devices106 suggests that
this overall authority issue does not bother the court.
Turning to fiduciary duty and lock-ups brings us to Revlon.
Prompted in part by Revlon but extending to situations not
governed by Revlon,107 the Delaware Supreme Court has
conflated the white knight situation with the situation in which
directors avoid or coerce shareholder consent in order to push
through a merger or sale favored by the board prior to any threat
of a hostile tender offer.108 Hence, lock-ups and deal protection
devices seem to trigger Unocal even when they do not trigger
Revlon.109 Unfortunately, the Delaware Supreme Court has made
a muddle of the rationale for and the implications of triggering
Unocal in these situations.
In Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.,110 the Delaware
Supreme Court sought to explain the basis for invoking Unocal
when the directors were not seeking to thwart a hostile tender
105. Compare ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 576, 588 (Neb.
1986) (stating that the corporation was not bound by an agreement to submit a
merger to a shareholder vote because there was no binding merger agreement
before shareholders approved), with Jewel Cos., Inc. v. Pay Less Drug Stores
Nw., Inc., 741 F.2d 1555, 1560 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that the board may bind
the corporation not to enter into competing contracts until the shareholders
have an opportunity to vote on the proposed merger).
106. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173, 183 (Del. 1986) (“[A] lock-up is not per se illegal under Delaware law.”).
107. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150
(Del. 1989) (treating the denial of a shareholder vote on a deal agreed to by the
board before any threat of a hostile tender offer as if it was a takeover defense,
in a case in which Revlon did not apply).
108. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34,
46 (Del. 1994) (applying enhanced scrutiny to lock-ups in a deal agreed to before
the threat of a hostile tender offer).
109. See e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 930–31
(Del. 2003) (applying Unocal to deal protection terms in a merger agreement not
entered in response to a hostile tender offer and not covered by Revlon).
110. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
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offer. The court spoke of the “conflicts of interest [that] arise
when a board acts to prevent the shareholders from effectively
exercising their right to vote contrary to the will of the board.”111
In other words, the court appears to be treating the mere desire
of the board to have its way on a corporate decision requiring
mutual consent of the board and the shareholders as a conflict of
interest requiring heightened scrutiny without regard to whether
the directors have any other self-interest at stake. This concern
with preserving an effective shareholder franchise in approving
mergers finds further reflection in the substance of Unocal as
later refined by the Delaware Supreme Court. Specifically, as
later interpreted, Unocal bans “coercive” or “preclusive”
defenses.112 This would seem to provide a basis for invalidating
lock-ups that coerce shareholders into voting for a board-favored
deal. Yet, it remains unclear how much the Delaware Supreme
Court really will protect shareholder voice in corporate mergers.
Specifically, although the Delaware Supreme Court has stated
that devices which lead shareholders to vote for a transaction on
the basis of something other than its merits are coercive,113 the
court defanged this in the deal protection context by holding that
termination fees and lock-ups are part of the transaction and so
the influence of such terms on the shareholder vote does not lead
the shareholders to vote based upon something other than the
merits of the deal.114 Further, it is doubtful that the Omnicare
Court would have invalidated the agreement in that case had the
directors left themselves an escape clause to take a better deal if
one came along before the shareholders voted.115 This suggests
111. Id. at 930.
112. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1386–88 (Del. 1995).
113. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1382–83 (Del. 1996) (“Wrongful
coercion may exist where the board or some other party takes actions which
have the effect of causing the stockholders to vote in favor of the proposed
transaction for some reason other than the merits of that transaction.”).
114. Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 50 (Del. 1997) (finding that
termination fee provisions “were an integral part of the merits of the
transaction”).
115. See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 936–39 (finding that the deal in question did
not allow directors to uphold their fiduciary duties to minority stockholders).
Such a “fiduciary out” provision would not only have complied with the portion
of the court’s opinion explicitly commanding such a term but it also arguably
would have eliminated the basis for the court’s treating the deal as coercive
insofar as the merger was preordained to take place (because the board
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that concerns over shareholder consent may evaporate if the
court does not think that the directors got an undeniably bad
deal. This focus on patently inferior deals brings us to Revlon.
C. Revlon
Revlon arose out of an effort by a company, Pantry Pride, to
acquire Revlon. Pantry Pride was a small, highly leveraged
company that planned to acquire Revlon by using money raised
through the sale of junk bonds—a debt it would repay by selling
off Revlon’s divisions.116 After rejecting Pantry Pride’s offer to
purchase Revlon, Revlon’s board adopted a poison pill plan.117
When this turned out to be inadequate to deter Pantry Pride from
launching a cash tender offer for all Revlon shares, Revlon’s
board responded by having Revlon make a tender offer to
repurchase a substantial fraction of its own outstanding shares in
exchange for a combination of convertible preferred stock and, of
considerable significance to the events that followed, promissory
notes issued by Revlon.118 Revlon’s offer was hugely oversubscribed and Revlon purchased on a pro-rata basis from the
tendering shareholders the number of shares it offered to buy.119
While this turned the vast majority of Revlon’s shareholders into
also its creditors, the transaction did not stop Pantry Pride’s
unwanted advances. After Pantry Pride responded with a higher
price tender offer, Revlon’s board authorized its management to
seek other buyers for the company.120 Management’s efforts
produced a bid from the private equity firm Forstmann Little.121
The ultimate Forstmann bid, like the Pantry Pride bid,
involved paying cash for all outstanding Revlon stock financed by
promised to put it to a shareholder vote while the controlling shareholders
promised to vote for it). Id.
116. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
180–81 (Del. 1986).
117. Id. at 177.
118. Id.
119. See id. (stating that Revlon stockholders tendered 87% of the total
outstanding shares of Revlon (approximately 33 million shares) and the
company repurchased the 10 million shares it offered to buy on a pro rata basis).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 177–78.
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debt to be repaid through the sale of Revlon’s divisions.122
Forstmann’s price was slightly higher than the outstanding
Pantry Pride offer;123 albeit, Pantry Pride had announced its
intention to top any competing bid by at least a small margin.124
Pantry Pride never got the opportunity to do so because Revlon’s
board agreed to Forstmann’s offer.125 Critically in terms of cutting
off any further offer by Pantry Pride, the agreement with
Forstmann contained a lock-up provision requiring Revlon, if
anyone other than Forstmann acquired 40% of Revlon’s stock, to
sell a pair of divisions to Forstmann at a price far below the value
Revlon’s investment banker attributed to them.126 Revlon’s board
gave three reasons for entering the agreement with Forstmann:
the higher price (ignoring, of course, Pantry Pride’s announced
intention to top any bid); firmer financing (which the court found
not to be the case127); and, critically, that Forstmann had agreed
to actions to protect the value of the notes Revlon had issued in
the stock buy-back (many holders of which were threatening to
sue the board when the noteholders heard that the board would
support a leveraged buy-out of Revlon).128
Blocked by the lock-up, Pantry Pride sued. Applying Unocal,
the Delaware Supreme Court upheld Revlon’s initial defensive
steps, including adoption of the poison pill.129 The court’s
approach changed, however, when it reached the challenges to
the Forstmann agreement with its lock-up provision. Here, the
court announced a new rule for the situation in which the break122. Id. at 178.
123. The exact amount of the disparity was uncertain because, while the
Forstmann price was a dollar per share higher than Pantry Pride’s existing
offer, it would not be paid to the shareholders as soon as the Pantry Pride offer,
thereby offsetting some of the advantage when one factors in the time value of
money. Id. at 178 n.6.
124. Id. at 178.
125. Id. at 178–79.
126. Id. at 178. The agreement with Forstmann also contained a
termination fee and a no-shop provision. Id.
127. See id. at 184 (“[A]ny distinctions between the rival bidders’ methods of
financing the proposal were nominal at best . . . .”).
128. See id. at 178–79 (describing the Revlon board’s reasons for accepting
Forstmann’s bid).
129. See id. at 180–81 (noting that the board acted appropriately in the face
of an inadequate hostile bid).
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up of the company is inevitable and the board authorizes efforts
to sell the company:
The duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation
of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the
company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit.
This
significantly altered the board’s responsibilities under the
Unocal standards. It no longer faced threats to corporate
policy and effectiveness, or to the stockholders’ interests, from
a grossly inadequate bid. The whole question of defensive
measures became moot. The directors’ role changed from
defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with
getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the
company.130

From this language grew the notion that Revlon created a
new regime in takeover contests in which the directors
abandoned their role as defenders against a corporate takeover
and now must auction the company to get the highest price for
the shareholders.131 Finding that Revlon’s directors had breached
their duty in this regard by cutting off the auction not to get the
highest price but to favor the bid protecting the noteholders, the
Delaware Supreme Court upheld the injunction against carrying
out the Forstmann agreement.132
III. Problems in Applying the Revlon Gloss
The subsequent history of Revlon might stand for the
proposition that “bad facts make bad law.” More appropriately, it
stands for the proposition that sometimes courts should quit
while they are ahead. The decision in Revlon itself was
reasonable. The problems arose when Delaware courts assumed
that the case had something to say about situations in which the
directors were not choosing between two all-cash all-shares bids.
130. Id. at 182.
131. See Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 3280 (treating this passage as
establishing a situation (“Revlon-land”) in which Unocal is supplanted by a
narrower obligation).
132. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
185 (Del. 1986) (concluding that Revlon’s directors “allowed considerations other
than the maximization of shareholder profit to affect their judgment, and
followed a course that ended the auction for Revlon . . . to the ultimate
detriment of its shareholders.”).
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Specifically, it has been difficult to decide sensibly about which
other cases Revlon has something relevant to say and to figure
out what this something is.
A. What Triggers Revlon?
A quarter century of efforts by Delaware courts to decide
when Revlon applies reminds one a bit of the NFL’s experience
with replacement referees: Decisions often seem unpredictable
and paradoxical.
1. The Early Formulations
Revlon was less than entirely clear on what exactly triggers
its impact. The court referred to the increase in the hostile
bidder’s offers from which “it became apparent to all that the
breakup of the company was inevitable.”133 The court then stated
that the “board’s authorization permitting management to
negotiate a merger or buyout with a third party was a recognition
that the company was for sale.”134 Putting the two sentences
together, did the court mean that the rule it announced in Revlon
only became applicable if the board capitulates to seeking a sale,
or is it sufficient that an objective observer would conclude that
an acquisition was inevitable despite the board’s opposition?
Moreover, does any decision to sell the company trigger the rule
that Revlon announces or only a sale in which the buyer intends
to break-up the company? Also, what is a sale? For example, does
this include transactions such as a recapitalization of the
company through corporate share issuances and repurchases that
leaves a management group with a controlling block of shares?
The Delaware Supreme Court seemed to take a narrow and
formalistic approach to answering such questions in Ivanhoe
Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.135 Ivanhoe involved an
idiosyncratic situation in which the challenged board action
consisted of declaring a dividend that financed open market
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 182.
Id.
535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
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purchases by the company’s largest shareholder of more stock in
the company.136 These purchases left this shareholder still
owning slightly less than half the outstanding stock and the
shareholder agreed to limit its exercise of control.137 Yet, between
this party’s holdings and the shares held by management there
were not enough other shares left outstanding for anyone else to
purchase control.138 Hence, the end result left the management
free from the threat of a hostile bidder and entrenched in control.
Finding that the board did not sell the company—after all, the
shareholder, aided in its purchases by the board, did not buy the
whole company or even acquire control over the company, and the
group who ended up in control did not buy anything—the
Delaware Supreme Court held Revlon did not apply.139
In Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.,140 however, the
Delaware Supreme Court suggested a more expansive view.
Actually, the facts in MacMillan did not force the court to reach
situations much beyond Revlon itself. The company was faced
with two competing all-cash or largely all-cash bids, and the
board concluded that it would be in the best interest of the
shareholders to sell the company and initiate a formal auction.141
Nevertheless, the court sought to minimize the significance of its
Ivanhoe decision as involving a unique situation in which the
impact of strengthening management’s position was a secondary
effect.142 Moreover, the court stated that Revlon applied whether
the “sale” takes the form of an active auction, a management buyout, or a restructuring in which a party acquires control through
some combination of purchasing newly issued shares from the
corporation and the corporation repurchasing shares from other
stockholders.143
136. Id. at 1339–40.
137. Id. at 1340.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 1345 (emphasizing that the board sought to keep the
company independent and that there was no bidding or sale).
140. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
141. Id. at 1274–75.
142. See id. at 1285 n.35 (stating that the primary purpose of the board’s
actions in Ivanhoe was to “guide the corporation through the minefield of
dangers directly posed by one bidder, and potentially by another”).
143. Id. at 1285.
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2. The Paradox of Paramount’s Paramours

This is where things stood when the Delaware Supreme
Court dealt with a pivotal pair of cases involving efforts by the
movie company, Paramount, to merge with companies operating
cable television networks. The result is a paradox worthy of an
episode in Paramount’s “Star Trek” series.
In the first case, Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time,144
Paramount played the role of spurned suitor to Time—who not
only published magazines but also operated the HBO network.145
The prologue to this battle was that Time’s board had entered
into a merger agreement with another movie company,
Warner.146 The original merger agreement called for the
stockholders in Warner to obtain stock in the combined Time–
Warner entity.147 This stock deal, however, required a vote of the
Time shareholders.148 Before such a vote could take place,
Paramount beamed in with a generous tender offer to the Time
shareholders.149 This, in turn, caused Time’s board to restructure
the transaction with Warner as a cash tender offer to the Warner
shareholders with a follow-up merger in which the remaining
Warner shareholders received cash and some securities.150 This
change meant that Time’s shareholders did not get to vote on the
deal.151 Paramount and some other Time shareholders sued.
Some of the plaintiffs argued that the decision of Time’s board to
merge with Warner—whose pre-merger shareholders under the
original plan would end up with a larger stake in the combined
Time–Warner entity than would the pre-merger Time
shareholders152—put Time up for sale and thereby triggered
144. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
145. Id. at 1143.
146. Id. at 1146.
147. Id. at 1145.
148. See id. at 1146 (noting that this requirement was imposed by the rules
of the New York Stock Exchange but not by the Delaware statute).
149. See id. at 1147 (stating that Paramount offered to purchase Time’s
shares for $175 per share, nearly $50 more than their trading price at the time).
150. Id. at 1148.
151. See id. at 1149 (noting Paramount’s argument that the revised
agreement was preclusive in part because Time’s shareholders could not vote on
the merger).
152. Under the original Time–Warner merger agreement, the former
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Revlon.153 Both the Delaware Chancery and Supreme Court
rejected this argument.154 To the Chancery Court the critical
factor was that the board’s choice under either plan contemplated
no shift in control over Time because control over Time would
remain in whatever transitory alliance among numerous
unaffiliated shareholders created a majority vote in a given
election.155 While stating that the Chancery Court’s observation
was correct, the Delaware Supreme Court preferred to place its
reliance on the fact that the transaction favored by Time’s board
did not involve the dissolution or breakup of Time, either after
the board initiated an active bidding process (as in MacMillan) or
after the board abandoned a defensive posture and sought to sell
the company (as in Revlon).156
The notion that sales only trigger Revlon when they involve
the break-up or dissolution of the company and follow an auction
or occur as a defensive response to another bid did not last a
second
case
involving
Paramount.
In
Paramount
157
Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., it was Paramount’s
board that played the role that Time’s board had earlier. It
Warner shareholders would have ended up owning 62% of the combined
company. Id. at 1146.
153. See id. at 1149 (describing the arguments of the shareholder plaintiffs).
154. Id. at 1142.
155. See id. at 1150 (describing the Chancery Court’s position that no
change in control had taken place because the majority of shares were still held
by the market, rather than any individual shareholder). The lack of any change
in control over Time was certainly true as the deal ended up because the former
Warner shareholders received mostly cash and some securities rather than
Time stock. Id. at 1149. Even as the Time–Warner merger was originally
structured, however, the Chancery Court viewed control over Time to be
unchanged, despite the receipt by the former Warner shareholders of a majority
of the voting stock in Time. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc., Nos.
10866, 10670 & 10935, 1989 WL 79880, at *739 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989) (“It is
irrelevant . . . that 62% of Time–Warner stock would have been held by former
Warner shareholders). Essentially, the Chancery Court conceived of the former
Warner shareholders as indistinguishable from the original Time
shareholders—in both cases, the shareholders were simply numerous
unaffiliated investors in a fluid market. See id. (“[W]here, as here, the shares of
both constituent corporations are widely held, corporate control can be expected
to remain unaffected by a stock for stock merger.”).
156. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150–51
(Del. 1989) (stating that these are the two scenarios that trigger Revlon).
157. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
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entered into a merger agreement with a cable network company
(Viacom Inc., who operated Showtime) and then faced a
competitive bid from another cable network company (QVC, who
operated the home shopping network).158 The original
Paramount–Viacom
merger
agreement
contained
some
aggressive deal protection provisions, including a no-shop
provision that limited Paramount’s ability to talk with competing
bidders, a $100 million termination fee for Viacom if the deal did
not go through, and, most significantly, an option for Viacom to
buy almost 20% of Paramount’s stock cheaply if the deal did not
go through.159 Paramount’s board refused to consider QVC’s offer.
Instead, while Paramount’s board renegotiated the merger
agreement with Viacom in response to QVC’s offer in order to
change what Paramount’s shareholders received in the Viacom
deal, Paramount’s board made no effort to change the deal
protection devices.160 Viewing these devices to be a serious
barrier, QVC sued.161
Because the Viacom deal did not involve the breakup or
dissolution of Paramount either after a board initiated auction or
in a defensive sale in response to QVC’s bid, Paramount’s board
assumed that Revlon did not apply.162 The Delaware Supreme
Court, however, pulled a surprise on Paramount’s board. The
court focused on the fact that the deal Paramount’s board made
with Viacom would leave Viacom’s controlling shareholder
(Sumner Redstone) in control of the combined entity.163 By
contrast, the court explained, the transaction in Time had left
control in whatever fluid aggregation of unaffiliated shareholders
might come together to cast a majority vote in any given

158. Id. at 37–40.
159. Id. at 39.
160. Id. at 40–41.
161. Id. at 40.
162. See id. at 46 (noting the defendants’ position that a breakup is
necessary to trigger Revlon).
163. See id. at 43, 46 (emphasizing that Revlon applies in a situation where
there is a change in corporate control, in this case due to the presence of a
controlling shareholder). Redstone owned an overwhelming majority of the
voting stock in Viacom, and the shareholders of Paramount would only receive a
limited amount of voting (as opposed to non-voting) stock in Viacom. Id. at 38–
40.
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election164—in other words, the Delaware Supreme Court
belatedly decided to rely on the rationale of the Chancery Court
in Time.
In the end, the outcome in Time and QVC create something
of a paradox—the paradox of Paramount’s paramours if you
will—as far as the application of Revlon. In QVC, the shift in
control over Paramount to a stranger under the proposed
Paramount–Viacom merger165 triggered what all assumed was
the more intensive scrutiny under Revlon as opposed to Unocal.
By contrast, in Time, the court applied the presumably lesser
scrutiny of Unocal to Time’s marriage to Warner—even though
this marriage left Time’s board and management in charge of the
combined entity.166 As a result, the rule appears to be that the
greater the conflict of interest by the target’s board (as far as
retaining the current directors’ and managers’ power), the less
the court’s scrutiny of the board’s action.
3. Subsequent Confusion
Cases after QVC demonstrate the problems Delaware courts
continue to encounter in deciding what triggers Revlon. As
discussed earlier,167 Revlon left open the question of whether
objective circumstances or board decisions trigger the doctrine.
Actually, this question can manifest itself in a couple of different
ways. The more common argument would be that even though
the board had not yet decided to seek a sale implicating Revlon,
the situation was such that a sale was inevitable (in common
parlance, the company is “in play”). In Lyondell Chemical Co. v.
164. See id. at 46–48 (explaining that Time did not implicate Revlon because
control remained dispersed in the market).
165. While Paramount’s CEO apparently was to be the CEO of the combined
Paramount–Viacom company, the existence of a controlling shareholder of the
combined company presumably would place the CEO into a subordinate role. Id.
at 38.
166. Indeed, a critical component of the Time–Warner deal was the
retention of ‘‘Time culture’’ for the company by assuring that senior Time
executives would end up in charge. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc.,
571 A.2d 1140, 1146 (Del. 1989) (noting that several of Time’s directors
advocated paying a premium to keep the company’s culture intact).
167. Supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
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Ryan,168 the Delaware Supreme Court held that the triggering
event is the board’s decision.169 Flipping the situation around,
suppose the board decides to seek a buyer who will break up or
dissolve the company (a Revlon transaction), but, in the end, the
board only enters a transaction that leaves control in the market.
In Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc.,170 the Delaware
Supreme Court held that a stock-for-stock merger that left
control in the market did not trigger Revlon even though the
directors had unsuccessfully sought a bust-up transaction prior to
agreeing to the stock merger.171
A more controversial question is whether triggering Revlon
depends upon the nature of the consideration received by the
shareholders.172 To the simple minded,173 the most obvious fact
about the situation in Revlon is that it involved a choice between
two all-cash all-shares bids.174 As discussed later,175 a
straightforward explanation for the result in Revlon is that when
directors decide to sell to one of two bidders, both of whom will
pay all of the shareholders cash for all of their shares, the only
legitimate goal is to get the most cash. Strangely, however,
Revlon,176 MacMillan,177 and later descriptions of those cases by
the Delaware Supreme Court178 do not focus on this fact. Instead,
168. 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009).
169. See id. at 242 (“The duty to seek the best available price applies only
when a company embarks on a transaction—on its own initiative or in response
to an unsolicited offer—that will result in a change of control.”).
170. 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994).
171. See id. at 1274, 1289–90 (emphasizing that the board did not initiate a
bidding process, and that subjective intent is not relevant to the Revlon inquiry).
172. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 3323–37 (criticizing Delaware
Chancery Court decisions suggesting that cash sales trigger Revlon).
173. Me.
174. This was also largely true in Macmillan, in which one bid introduced a
small amount of subordinated debt. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan Inc.,
559 A.2d 1261, 1275 (Del. 1989) (stating that less than 10% of one of the bids
consisted of subordinated securities, with the rest made up of cash).
175. See infra notes 278–79 and accompanying text (providing a simple
explanation for the result in Revlon).
176. See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text (discussing Revlon’s
triggering language).
177. See 559 A.2d at 1285 (describing the circumstances in which Revlon is
triggered).
178. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150
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they talk about transactions involving the break-up or dissolution
of the corporation, either in response a hostile bid or resulting
from a board initiated auction. In other words, the traditional
description of what triggered the Revlon decision itself and its
application in MacMillan focuses on context and process (a
decision to sell in response to a hostile bid or to auction the
company) and the outcome for the corporation (dissolution or
break-up) but not the outcome with respect to the shareholders of
the corporation (whether they are cashed out).179 Given how
common cash sales of corporations are,180 the implications of this
question as to the scope of Revlon is evident.
The original emphasis on the outcome for the corporation
(dissolution or break-up) is embedded in the metaphor the court
employed in Revlon. In Revlon, the court spoke of the board’s
decision to abandon the role of defender of the corporate
bastion.181 Before this point, Unocal had allowed the board to
respond to “a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness.”182 If
the board, however, decided to abandon the defense of the
corporation and allow its dissolution or break-up, justifications
based upon threats to corporate policy and effectiveness were
presumably inapplicable, and so the idea of triggering the new
rule based upon what would happen to the corporation seemed to
follow.
At first glance, the two cases involving Paramount reinforce
the notion that the nature of the consideration does not matter. If
the nature of the consideration was important, then both the
Delaware Chancery and Supreme Court in Time could have
disposed of the plaintiffs’ argument that Revlon applied by
pointing out that neither version of the Time–Warner merger
(Del. 1989) (characterizing the aspects of Revlon and MacMillan that triggered
the Revlon doctrine).
179. Perhaps the notion that all of the shareholders will be cashed out is
implicit in the criteria that the transaction involve the dissolution or break-up of
the corporation; but there are other ways in which to cash out all of the
shareholders besides dissolution or break-up. See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 16,
at 1138–39 (describing mechanisms for freezing out minority shareholders
following an acquisition of control).
180. See, e.g., id. at 935–36 (discussing advantages of cash versus stock as
consideration in the purchase and sale of a corporation).
181. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing Revlon’s rule).
182. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
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cashed out Time’s shareholders (the original iteration being a
stock-for-stock deal and the final iteration cashing out the
Warner, rather than the Time, shareholders).183 Moreover, QVC
applied Revlon despite the competing offers containing
considerable fractions of equity.184 Even so, QVC introduced an
important conceptual shift that suggests the nature of the
consideration might matter. Specifically, in holding that a change
in control can trigger Revlon, QVC focused on the impact of the
transaction upon the shareholders—who would find themselves
in the more dangerous position of minority shareholders in a
corporation with a controlling shareholder and who would lose
the ability to share in the proceeds of selling control185—rather
than the impact of the transaction upon the corporation. If the
impact upon the shareholders is the trigger, then the dramatic
impact of being cashed out seems relevant.
Subsequent Delaware Supreme Court opinions are
inconclusive. In Lyondell, the Delaware Supreme Court dealt
with a case in which the Chancery Court held that Lyondell’s
directors breached their duties under Revlon in approving a cashout merger with a privately held company.186 Although rejecting
the Chancery Court’s notion that Revlon began to apply the
moment Lyondell was “in play” as opposed to when the directors
decided to start negotiating the sale, the Delaware Supreme
Court nevertheless implicitly accepted the conclusion that the
cash-out merger constituted a change in control triggering
Revlon.187 On the other hand, was this a change in control
because cashing out all the existing Lyondell shareholders
removed their role in the corporation? Or was it a change in
control because the buyer was a privately held company and so

183. See supra notes 144–51 accompanying text (explaining the transaction
at issue in Time).
184. See infra notes 210–11 and accompanying text (noting the mix of cash
and stock in the Viacom and QVC bids).
185. See infra note 311 and accompanying text (discussing the shareholders’
loss of control).
186. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 237 (Del. 2009)
(describing the Chancery Court’s ruling).
187. See id. at 242–43 (stating that Revlon duties did not kick in until the
board began to negotiate the merger).
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control had passed from unaffiliated dispersed shareholders in
the market? The Delaware Supreme Court never actually said.
In Lyondell, the Delaware Supreme Court cited its post-QVC
opinion in Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litigation188 for the
proposition that a change in control triggers Revlon.189 In Santa
Fe, the court held that Revlon did not apply to a merger with a
company lacking a controlling shareholder when 33% of the
shareholders received cash in the transaction and the rest
received stock.190 What, if anything, this tells us about an entirely
(or even predominately) cash-out deal, however, is in the eye of
the beholder.191
Lacking unequivocal direction from the Delaware Supreme
Court, the Delaware Chancery Court has issued several opinions
stating that cash-out mergers may trigger Revlon if the cash
constitutes a primary proportion of the consideration, even if the
merger occurs with a company that lacks a controlling
shareholder such that unaffiliated shareholders in the market
still ultimately control the combined firms.192 The basic rationale
is that “there is no long run” for the cashed-out shareholders to
justify forgoing maximum immediate value in favor of the sort of
considerations listed in Unocal.193 So far, none of these decisions
actually has found that the directors breached their fiduciary
duty under Revlon; albeit a recent decision explicitly applied
Revlon to a half cash-out/half stock-for-stock merger with a
company lacking a controlling shareholder.194
188. 669 A.2d 59 (1995).
189. Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 242.
190. Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 64–65, 71.
191. Compare In re NYMEX S’holder Litig., C.A. Nos. 3621-VCN, 3835-VCN,
2009 WL 3206051, at *5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2009) (characterizing Santa Fe as
establishing a floor of 33% below which cash would be insufficient to trigger
Revlon), with Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 57–58 (characterizing Santa Fe as
establishing that sales to public companies do not trigger Revlon).
192. See, e.g., In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No.
6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076, at *15 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2011) (emphasizing the
importance of cash consideration); In re NYMEX S’holder Litig., 2009 WL
3206051, at *5 (noting that when cash is the exclusive consideration, Revlon is
triggered); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 732 n.25 (Del. Ch.
1999) (discussing the amount of cash consideration that would be sufficient to
trigger Revlon).
193. In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d at 732 n.25.
194. In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., 2011 WL 2028076,
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B. What Does Revlon Do?

Not only has it been uncertain what triggers Revlon, it has
also been uncertain what Revlon actually does. Specifically,
Revlon and later cases applying the doctrine suggest three
possible impacts: (i) limiting the goals directors can pursue in the
situation; (ii) supplanting general standards governing the
directors’ conduct and the courts’ review of this conduct with
more specific rules for the process directors are to follow; and
(iii) imposing a heightened standard of judicial scrutiny over
directors’ actions. Unfortunately, Delaware courts have been
neither clear nor consistent in articulating or applying these
possible impacts to the doctrine. In part, this is because the
Delaware Supreme Court has treated these three impacts like the
three shells in the carnival game in which pea always seems
magically to appear under a different shell than the player
guessed. In part, this is because the logical extension of these
impacts either creates inconsistencies with other principles of
Delaware corporate law or else suggests that “there is no there
there” when it comes to the impact of Revlon.
1. Limitation of Permissible Goals
The Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in Revlon focused
much of its attention upon the Revlon board’s motive for favoring
Forstmann’s bid over Pantry Pride’s. Specifically, the court stated
that Revlon’s board breached its duty because the board acted
principally to protect Revlon noteholders rather than to obtain
the best price for Revlon’s shareholders.195 Hence, one aspect of
the Revlon doctrine seems to be a specification of permissible
goals for directors to pursue once they enter into the sphere
governed by Revlon. Yet, it is not clear what this motivational
aspect of Revlon requires or how it fits with the motivational
at *15 (finding Revlon applicable when half of the stockholders’ investment was
liquidated).
195. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
184 (Del. 1986) (“The principal object, contrary to the board's duty of care,
appears to have been protection of the noteholders over the shareholders’
interests.”).
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limitations imposed upon directors’ conduct outside of Revlon. In
order to understand why this is so, one must work through the
several layers folded within the court’s conclusion.
The bottom layer involves why Revlon’s directors cared about
the interests of the noteholders. The court believed this was
because the noteholders threatened to sue the directors.196 Hence,
at first glance, the situation would appear to involve nothing
more than a simple duty of loyalty violation in which the
directors put their self-interest in avoiding personal liability
ahead of their duty to the shareholders. On further reflection,
however, this is not so simple. Treating fear of personal liability
as a conflict of interest might suggest that directors or other
corporate officials have a duty to disregard their other legal
obligations if doing so will advance shareholder interests—hardly
a savory proposition.197 In the end, however, the court avoided the
need to consider such implications by concluding that the
directors had no duty to the noteholders (and therefore the
directors’ self-interest flowed from only their incorrect perception
of a risk of personal liability).198
Putting aside self-interest, the next question regarding
legitimate goals was whether the directors could sacrifice
shareholder interests for the interests of the noteholders. Here,
the court entered into the long debate about shareholder primacy

196. See id. (noting the benefit to the directors, who avoided personal
liability).
197. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011) (stating that the
certificate of incorporation cannot waive liability for a knowing violation of law);
GEVURTZ, supra note 44, at 326 (“[I]t is unheard of for a court to suggest that a
director or officer could possibly breach his or her duty to the corporation by
refusing to have the corporation engage in illegal activity.”).
198. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182–83 (noting that the noteholders’ rights
were limited to their contract and that the board owed them no further duty).
Actually, because directors and other officials can only act based upon their
perception of legal duties, which can always be wrong, one might legitimately
worry that a rule placing the risk of such erroneous determinations on directors
and officers will deter non-erroneous efforts to comply with legal limits on what
directors can do in search of profits for the shareholders. See, e.g., Bohatch v.
Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 561 (Tex. 1998) (Spector, J. dissenting)
(arguing that allowing expulsion of a law firm partner, who reported her
ultimately erroneous suspicions of overbilling by a fellow partner, will deter
other lawyers from complying with their ethical obligations to report suspected
overbilling in the future).
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versus stakeholder models199 in one of the rare decisions in which
this actually mattered. Confronted with the language in its
earlier Unocal decision stating that directors may take into
account the interests of other corporate constituencies in reacting
to a hostile tender offer,200 the court in Revlon explained that this
is only true if there are rationally related benefits accruing to the
shareholders.201 This, the court concluded, meant that concern for
non-shareholder interests was no longer appropriate once the
directors decided to auction rather than protect the company.202
As explained later in this article,203 this analysis invokes a highly
traditional, although often highly artificial, reconciliation of
stakeholder interests with shareholder primacy long found in
corporate-law decisions in the United States.
In specifying that self-interest and the interest of other
constituencies when not tied to the benefit of the shareholders
were inappropriate goals, the court in Revlon reached a result no
different than it could have reached by simply applying the
business judgment rule. On top of these two layers, however,
Revlon set out a command identifying the goal toward which the
directors must work. Specifically, the court stated that once the
situation changed from defending against a takeover to selling
the company, the central theme guiding the directors should have
been obtaining the highest price for the shareholders.204 Like a
shimmering mirage on the desert surface, this command
promises much and delivers frustration.

199. See infra note 282 and accompanying text (explaining the shareholder
primacy debate).
200. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)
(stating that the board can take into account the “impact on ‘constituencies’
other than shareholders”).
201. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
182 (Del. 1986) (stating that the board can only consider other constituencies if
there are rationally related benefits to the stakeholders).
202. See id. (stating that the board could no longer protect the noteholders
and claim there were rationally related benefits to the shareholders from doing
so).
203. See infra notes 282–94 and accompanying text (analyzing Revlon in the
context of the shareholder primacy debate).
204. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (emphasizing that the board’s only
permissible objective is to obtain the best price for shareholders).
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In part, this may have been because the command makes
more sense in its original context. In the Revlon opinion, the
command to obtain the best price for the shareholders largely
appears in juxtaposition to the impermissible goals of advancing
the interests of the noteholders and avoiding personal liability for
the directors.205 Hence, it may simply have meant that the
directors’ obligation was to put the shareholders’ interest ahead
of the interests of other constituencies and of the directors’
themselves. Moreover, the factual context for this statement in
Revlon involved a situation in which there were two competing
all-cash bids with essentially the same method of financing.206
Having decided to accept one of these bids, what other goal could
the directors legitimately pursue besides getting the best price?
Still, the Delaware courts have not been content to leave this
aspect of Revlon to its original context. Instead, they have
grabbed at the shiny object and attempted to apply this command
to contexts in which the choice facing the directors was not
simply between accepting one of two all-cash bids equivalent in
their impact on the shareholders except for the price. Like a law
professor’s hypotheticals that start close to the original case and
then become increasingly different, this started with a minor
variant on two all-cash bids. In MacMillan, the contest was
between one all-cash bid and a blended bid with mostly cash and
a small amount of subordinated debt securities.207 With nary a
pause to remark on the difference, the Delaware Supreme Court
responded by changing the wording of its Revlon command from a
duty to obtain the “highest price” to a duty to get the “highest
value reasonably attainable for the shareholders”208 or, at
another point of the opinion, to obtain the “highest price
reasonably available to the company, provided it was offered by a

205. See id. (“[S]uch concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate
when an auction among active bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is
to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest
bidder.”).
206. See id. at 184 (finding any difference between the bids nominal at best
in terms of financing).
207. Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1274–75 (Del.
1989).
208. Id. at 1288.
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reputable and responsible bidder.”209 Of course, the presence of
subordinated debt complicates the comparison of the two bids,
especially insofar as it may continue to link the fate of the selling
shareholders to the future fortunes of the company if those
fortunes turn sufficiently negative to impact the company’s
ability to service the debt. Still, the presence of a small amount of
subordinated debt might not seem to leave the situation that
much changed from Revlon.
As law students soon discover, once one begins down the road
of applying the rule despite a seemingly minor difference, the
trap is sprung and before long one faces much more significant
differences. In this instance, the significant differences arrived in
QVC. There, both bids involved a mix of cash and continuing
equity in the combined company. QVC’s bid involved a cash
tender offer for 51% of Paramount’s outstanding stock, with the
remaining 49% receiving QVC common stock in a follow-on
merger.210 The initial merger agreement with Viacom gave
Paramount shareholders a small amount of cash and a mix of
voting and non-voting Viacom stock, while Viacom’s later merger
agreement matched QVC’s proposal for a cash tender offer for
51% of Paramount’s stock and then a mix of voting, non-voting
and convertible preferred shares in Viacom for the other 49%.211
In response, the Delaware Supreme Court invoked the “best
value reasonably attainable for the shareholders” formulation

209. Id. at 1282. The court elaborated on this caveat in a footnote:
In assessing the bid and the bidder’s responsibility, a board may
consider, among various proper factors, the adequacy and terms of
the offer; its fairness and feasibility; the proposed or actual financing
for the offer, and the consequences of that financing; questions of
illegality; the impact of both the bid and the potential acquisition on
other constituencies, provided that it bears some reasonable
relationship to general shareholder interests; the risk of
nonconsumation; the basic stockholder interests at stake; the bidder’s
identity, prior background and other business venture experiences;
and the bidder’s business plans for the corporation and their effects
on stockholder interests.
Id. at 1282 n.29.
210. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 40–41
(Del. 1993).
211. Id. at 39–41.
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from MacMillan instead of the best price formulation from Revlon
as the goal directors must pursue.212
Yet, how does this best value reasonably attainable for the
shareholders objective differ from the continuing obligation that
directors owe to the shareholders in any decision directors make
regarding a corporate merger or acquisition, or, indeed, in any
context? Put in terms of a concrete example, how did the
permissible objective for the Paramount’s directors in agreeing to
the Viacom merger rather than going with QVC differ from the
permissible objective for Time’s directors in agreeing to the
Warner merger rather than going with Paramount in the Time
case, where, as discussed earlier,213 the court did not apply
Revlon? The court’s answer is a Rorschach test.
For those predisposed to find that Revlon narrows the
acceptable goal for directors, the court in QVC stated that the
directors should try to quantify the value of any non-cash
consideration if feasible.214 The court further explained in a
footnote that the board should focus on the value of the non-cash
consideration as of the date the shareholders will receive it and
that such value normally will be determined with the assistance
of experts using generally accepted methods of valuation.215 By
contrast, the court in Time explained that whereas Revlon
triggers a duty to maximize “immediate shareholder value,”
review under Unocal was not intended to lead to a simple
“mathematical exercise” of comparing the discounted value of
Time–Warner shares at some point in the future versus the value
of Paramount’s offer.216The problem, of course, is that the value of
the two bids in QVC depended in substantial measure upon the
future performance of the equity in each packet, which, in turn,
depended both on the performance of the combined entity
(Paramount and Viacom or Paramount and QVC) and the
212. Id. at 43.
213. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing the Time court’s
view of Revlon’s applicability).
214. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 44 (“Where stock or other non-cash consideration
is involved, the board should try to quantify its value, if feasible, to achieve an
objective comparison of the alternatives.”).
215. See id. at 44 n.14 (discussing the valuation of non-cash consideration).
216. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del.
1989).
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interest in the combined entity represented by the shares
received by Paramount’s stockholders.217 But these two variables
were at the heart of the decision facing the directors in Time.
Specifically, the impact of the originally agreed Time–Warner
merger on Time’s pre-merger stockholders depended upon
whether the future earnings of the combined entity outweighed
the dilution of the stockholders’ interest resulting from issuing
Time shares to the Warner stockholders.218 Once Paramount
arrived on the scene with a competitive bid, there was the
additional question as to whether the value Time’s shareholders
gained in the Warner merger exceeded what Paramount offered.
How is the determination of the value called for under QVC and
Revlon supposed to differ from the more open-ended goals
analysis allowed under Time? Is the court saying that because
Revlon did not apply, Time’s directors were free to ignore whether
the increased earnings from the Time–Warner combination would
at least eventually offset the dilution suffered by Time’s premerger shareholders or whether Paramount’s offer provided
better value for Time’s stockholders than the Warner
combination no matter how and when measured?
Maybe the court is saying that without Revlon directors are
entitled to use their own informed judgment on whether a
combination or other decision enhances shareholder value, but
once Revlon applies directors must look to the market valuations
of exchanged securities.219 Yet other language in QVC casts doubt
on this interpretation. Specifically, the court in QVC elevated to
text its footnote in MacMillan in which it discussed the latitude
open to directors in weighing bids under Revlon.220 So, the court
217. See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 16, at 918–36 (discussing valuation in
the context of selling a corporation, including the impact when sellers receive
shares in the purchasing corporation).
218. See id. at 935 (discussing the impact on the purchasing corporation’s
shareholders of issuing shares to purchase another corporation).
219. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The
Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. Rev. 521, 523–24 (2002)
(explaining Revlon as a situation in which courts focus on “visible” (market)
value to measure a transaction’s merits, instead of allowing directors to act
based upon their potential knowledge of the corporation’s “hidden” value that
market price does not reflect).
220. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del.
1994).
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explained, directors are entitled under Revlon to take into
account an offer’s fairness and feasibility as well as the bidder’s
business plans for the corporation and their effects on stockholder
interest.221 To reinforce the point, the court also stated that the
directors are not limited to considering only the amount of cash
involved—which would seem rather obvious when the bid
includes significant non-cash consideration—and, of seemingly
greater importance, are not required to ignore totally the board’s
view of the future value of a strategic alliance.222
Perhaps the answer is not found in what the court said but in
what it actually did. In finding that Paramount’s directors
breached their duty, the court pointed to the one billion dollar
advantage of the QVC bid over the Viacom bid when measured by
the current market value of the securities involved and stated
that Paramount’s directors could not justify giving up this much
advantage based upon their vision of future strategy.223 While the
court based this conclusion in part upon the board’s loss of
credibility as a result of the board’s poor process, the court
explained that the primary reason for discounting valuation
based upon future strategy was because the current board would
not be in control of Paramount after the merger in order to carry
out its strategic vision.224 So, is the court saying that market
valuation trumps under Revlon and that a change in control
precludes consideration of the added value of a strategic
combination beyond that recognized in market prices, or is the
court saying that directors must justify disregarding huge
disparities in market valuations of competing bids and that a new
management’s continued willingness to implement the outgoing
board’s strategic plan following a change in control is too
uncertain a reed upon which to justify such a huge disparity? We
221. See id. (discussing the evaluation of bids) (citing Mills Acquisition Co. v.
MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 n.29 (Del. 1989)).
222. See id. at 44 (“In determining which alternative provides the best value
for the stockholders, a board of directors is not limited to considering only the
amount of cash involved, and is not required to ignore totally its view of the
future value of a strategic alliance.”).
223. See id. at 50 (explaining how the value of QVC’s bid outweighed any
strategic benefits from accepting Viacom’s bid).
224. See id. (noting the change in control would remove the board’s
authority to implement its strategic vision).
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shall return to this question when we consider whether Revlon
imposes a higher level of judicial scrutiny over directors’ decisions
than imposed by Unocal.
In the meantime, this language in QVC starts to shift our
attention from goals to process. Specifically, another way of
viewing the language about valuing non-cash consideration with
the aid of experts using accepted methods of valuation is that the
overall goal for directors remains the same—get the best value
for the shareholders—but now the process directors should use in
working toward this goal has narrowed. This brings us to the
second possible impact of Revlon.
2. Substitution of Process Rules for General Standards of Conduct
and Review
Early in their legal studies, many law students in the United
States read a pair of Supreme Court opinions that deal with
accidents at railroad crossings.225 In the first case, Justice Holmes
announced a rule that an automobile driver who approaches a
railroad track at which the driver cannot see if there is an
oncoming train must stop the car and get out and look, and that
the failure to do so amounts to negligence precluding recovery.226
In the second case, Justice Cardozo confronted a situation in
which the existence of four parallel tracks at the crossing would
have rendered an effort to follow this “stop, get out and look rule”
impractical.227 Justice Cardozo’s solution is to explain that there
is no “stop, get out and look rule”; rather, the only rule is that the
driver must act reasonably under the circumstances and the
driver in the prior case had not done so under the particular facts

225. See, e.g., MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN & MICHAEL D. GREEN,
TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 60–64 (8th ed. 2011)
(including these cases as part of a fundamental study of tort law).
226. See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 69–70 (1927)
(“In such circumstances it seems to us that if a driver cannot be sure otherwise
whether a train is dangerously near he must stop and get out of his
vehicle . . . .”).
227. See Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 101 (1934) (“This does not
mean, however, that if vision was cut off by obstacles, there was negligence in
going on . . . .”).
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of that case.228 The purpose of reading these cases is not to learn
about railroad crossing accidents. Rather, in addition to raising
the roles of judges and juries, these opinions expose students to a
fundamental tension between governing conduct with specific
rules or with general standards.229 When setting forth the impact
of Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court has tried to have it both
ways.230 The result has been confusion.
This confusion came to something of a head a few years ago
in Lyondell. The situation in Lyondell reminds one a little of the
famous Smith v. Van Gorkom decision,231 albeit in Lyondell the
board seemed to have carefully analyzed the deal, including
receiving the opinion of an investment banking firm (who
described the offer as “an absolute home run”).232 Even though
the shareholders approved the deal by a 99% vote,233 some
shareholders still brought a class action alleging that the
directors breached their duty.234 Despite these circumstances, the
plaintiff was able to avoid summary judgment in the Chancery
Court based upon the argument that Revlon applied; that Revlon
required the directors to conduct an auction prior to, or a market
test after, accepting the cash-out deal unless the directors could
establish they had impeccable knowledge of the market; and that
228. See id. at 102–06 (acknowledging that the rule should not apply in all
instances where such conduct would not be expected of a reasonable man under
the circumstances).
229. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
230. Delaware courts frequently have tried to gain the advantage of specific
guidelines within general standards by providing directors “safe harbor”
suggestions for processes that will clearly comply with fiduciary duties. See, e.g.,
Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (“This Court has endeavored to
provide the directors with clear signal beacons and brightly lined-channel
markers as they navigate with due care, good faith, and loyalty on behalf of a
Delaware corporation and its shareholders.”); Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc.,
673 A.2d 148, 157 (Del. 1996) (acknowledging that safe harbors “remove[] the
specter of a post hoc judicial determination that the director or officer has
improperly usurped a corporate opportunity”). This is different, however, from
mandating specific processes.
231. See 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding directors breached their duty of
care in voting to sell the corporation in a two hour meeting based upon a twenty
minute oral presentation and without asking many questions).
232. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 238–39 (Del. 2009).
233. Id. at 239.
234. Id.
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there was a triable issue of fact regarding whether the directors
had such impeccable knowledge.235 The Delaware Supreme Court
would have none of this. Instead, the Delaware Supreme Court
explained that Revlon does not mandate an auction or any special
procedure; it mandates a goal of obtaining the highest price.236
So, how did the Chancery Court in Lyondell manage to get
this wrong? Telling the story in flashbacks, one sees a pattern of
confusing signals from the Delaware Supreme Court. This starts,
not surprisingly, in Revlon itself. The problem resulted from the
fact that recognizing a duty to get the highest price did not
immediately resolve the Revlon case. At the time Revlon’s board
acted, the Forstmann bid favored by the board was slightly
higher than the Pantry Pride bid, which the board disfavored.237
The court in Revlon held that this slight advantage did not justify
granting Forstmann lock-up and no-shop agreements that
deterred a further bid by Pantry Pride.238 The simple explanation
was that the board cut off further bidding not because the board
felt that it had extracted as high a price as it could but rather to
ensure that the bid protecting the noteholders (and the directors
themselves from lawsuits) prevailed,239 which, as discussed
above,240 is not a permissible goal. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court did not stop there. Instead, it also threw in language
suggesting that directors breach their duty by playing favorites
when auctioning the company and that market forces must be
allowed to operate freely to obtain the best price available for the
shareholders.241 From this nugget grew the notion that Revlon
235. See id. at 241, 243 (discussing the Chancery Court’s basis for denying
summary judgment).
236. See id. at 242 (noting that there is no specific way the directors must
acquire the highest price).
237. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (comparing the Forstmann
and Pantry Pride bids).
238. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
184 (Del. 1986) (noting that these provisions were impermissible when they did
not work to secure the highest bid).
239. See id. (“The principal benefit went to the directors, who avoided
personal liability to a class of creditors to whom the board owed no further duty
under the circumstances.”).
240. See supra notes 196–202 and accompanying text (elaborating on the
court’s implementation of the shareholder primacy theory).
241. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184 (”Market forces must be allowed to operate
freely to bring the target’s shareholders the best price available for their
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imposes process rules directors must follow.242 Subsequent
decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court have vacillated
between taming and inflaming this notion (sometimes both in the
same opinion).
Having seemingly condemned playing favorites in auctioning
the company, the Delaware Supreme Court felt compelled to
explain in MacMillan that directors have no independent duty to
conduct fair auctions for the sake of fair auctions.243 Rather, the
directors can favor one bidder.244 The directors’ duty in a Revlon
situation is simply to get the best price for the shareholders, and
the directors must justify any favoritism based upon achieving
this goal.245 So what then is the point of the language in Revlon
about not playing favorites and allowing market forces to work?
Fair auctions provide a means both for obtaining the highest
price and for verifying that the price is, in fact, the highest.246
This, however, raises the question of whether directors can use
other tools to obtain and verify the highest price in selling the
company, and, if so, what are the other tools.
The Delaware Supreme Court discussed this question at
some length in Barkan v. Amstead Industries.247 This discussion
began with the reassurance that Revlon does not command a
heated bidding contest (an auction) before any sale of control.248
The court then broke down situations that might arise into two
possibilities.249 The first was multiple bidders competing for
control. Here, the court returned to the admonition that fairness
equity.”).
242. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 3315 (indicating that the courts
have drawn lines as to what action is permissible under Revlon).
243. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1286–87
(Del. 1989) (noting that directors need not follow some standard formula when
initiating an auction).
244. See id. (recognizing that favoring one bidder is allowed, so long as it is
for the benefit of the stockholders).
245. See id. (noting that there must be a rational basis for any favoritism
involved).
246. See generally Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding,
25 J. ECON. LIT. 669 (1987).
247. 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989).
248. Id. at 1286.
249. See id. at 1286–87 (discussing instances of multiple bidders and single
bidders).
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to the shareholders precludes using defensive mechanisms to
favor one bidder over another,250 leading one to wonder what
happened to MacMillan’s statement that favoritism was
allowable if justified by getting the best deal for the shareholders.
Of significance to Lyondell, the court also discussed the situation
in which there was only one bidder. In this circumstance, the
court stated that unless the directors have reliable grounds for
determining if the one bid is adequate, they must canvass the
market to determine if higher bids might be available.251
Moreover, in commenting on what might constitute reliable
information sufficient to forgo canvassing the market, the court
cautioned that the advice of an investment banker is often a poor
substitute for a market test to determine the adequacy of a single
bid.252 Given this discussion, it is not surprising that the
Chancery Court in Lyondell thought that directors in a Revlon
situation without competing bidders must test the market unless
they can establish their impeccable knowledge of the market.253
Indeed, one suspects the Chancery Court judge may have felt
betrayed by the Delaware Supreme Court’s “now you tell me”
explanation that Revlon does not impose any specific process
obligations—at least until the Delaware Supreme Court says
something different again in another opinion.
3. Heightened Scrutiny
The final impact of Revlon is a notion of heightened scrutiny.
What this heightened scrutiny entails is not entirely clear. In
part, this is because the concept of heightened scrutiny gets
mixed together with statements of acceptable goals and a
specification of required process. In part, this is because it is
250. Id.
251. See id. at 1287 (“When the board is considering a single offer and has
no reliable grounds upon which to judge its adequacy, this concern for fairness
demands a canvas of the market to determine if higher bids may be elicited.”)
(citing In re Fort Howard Corp. S’holders Litig., CIV A. No. 9991, 1988 WL
83147 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988)).
252. Id.
253. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 241 (Del. 2009) (noting
the Chancery Court’s emphasis on the fact that directors failed to conduct “even
a limited market check”).
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uncertain how this heightened scrutiny meshes with the Unocal
standard and with the standards applicable to reviewing director
decisions generally.
As discussed earlier,254 judicial scrutiny of directors’ decisions
generally falls within the deferential standard of the business
judgment rule unless there is a conflict of interest without
disinterested approval, in which case the intrusive intrinsic
fairness test becomes applicable. Unocal establishes an
intermediate standard for takeover defenses under which
directors seemingly must prove the reasonableness of their
actions both in terms of objectives and means.255 Where does
Revlon fit into this? Specifically, when it comes to the degree of
scrutiny, does Revlon do anything more than Unocal? There are
two possibilities for doing more than Unocal: Revlon might
establish a new intermediate standard which is more demanding
than Unocal, albeit less demanding than the intrinsic fairness
test; or Revlon might extend Unocal’s reasonableness standard to
situations previously covered by the business judgment rule
standard.
In MacMillan, the Delaware Supreme Court equated the
degree of scrutiny under Unocal and Revlon. Specifically, the
court explained that if there is favoritism for one bidder over
another in auctioning the company, then the court must examine
under Unocal’s reasonableness standard whether the directors
perceived that the favoritism would advance shareholder
interests and whether the favoritism was reasonable in relation
to the advantage the directors sought to achieve.256 By contrast,
the two Delaware Supreme Court decisions dealing with
Paramount’s paramours (Time and QVC) provide more confusing
signals. Recall that the Delaware Supreme Court in these two
cases confronted arguments by the parties about whether Revlon

254. See supra notes 35–43 and accompanying text (comparing decisions
evaluated under the business judgment rule and conflict-of-interest
transactions).
255. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text (discussing the Unocal
standard).
256. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1286–88
(Del. 1989) (discussing the process to determine if disparate treatment was
appropriate).
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or just Unocal applied.257 If Revlon does not establish a more
demanding standard than Unocal, the Supreme Court might
have disposed of the whole issue by saying it did not matter.
Instead, the Delaware Supreme Court in QVC couched its
distinguishing Time and exploring whether Revlon applied in
terms of whether the court will employ “enhanced scrutiny” of the
board’s decision,258 which seems to suggest that Revlon requires
some higher level of scrutiny than Unocal.
Perhaps the enhanced scrutiny the court spoke of in QVC
referred to ensuring directors complied with some greater process
required under Revlon but not Unocal or with a narrowing of
acceptable goals under Revlon as opposed to under Unocal.
Indeed, as discussed earlier, there is language in Time and QVC
suggesting a narrowing of the acceptable goal for the board under
Revlon.259 Still, one can read this language not as narrowing the
permissible goal for directors but as increasing the scrutiny
applied by the court. So, to return to the passage in QVC in which
the court points to the $1 billion greater market value of the QVC
bid over the Viacom offer followed by the statement that this
disparity could not be justified by the Paramount directors’ vision
of future strategy,260 this might mean that directors must focus
their attention on the getting the most value for the shareholders
as measured by market prices. On the other hand, this could
reflect a greater level of scrutiny under which the court is willing
to examine market prices and other factors to decide for itself
whether the shareholders got the best value rather than
deferring to the directors’ balancing of market valuations versus
the directors’ internal assessments.261 The Delaware Supreme
257. See supra notes 153, 163–164 and accompanying text (discussing the
arguments in Time and QVC over whether Revlon or just Unocal applied).
258. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44–
46 (Del. 1994) (noting the enhanced scrutiny that applies when Revlon duties
are applicable).
259. See supra notes 214–16 and accompanying text (examining the court’s
recommendations for evaluating non-cash consideration).
260. QVC, 637 A.2d at 50 (stating that the disparity in market value
between the two offers outweighed any benefits provided by a strategic alliance).
261. To pursue this thought further, the court’s statement that a change in
control renders a valuation based upon future strategy insufficient to justify a
huge disparity in market valuation could be read to suggest that directors
cannot consider future strategy very much or it could be read to reflect a court
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Court’s decision in Arnold suggests, in fact, that this is about
scrutiny rather than goals or process. Specifically, the court, in a
footnote, scolded the plaintiff’s attorney for referring to “Revlon
duties” in order “inappropriately” to describe the “enhanced
scrutiny courts apply to certain types of transactions.”262
Beyond the question of whether Revlon creates a higher level
of scrutiny than Unocal, there is also the question of whether
Revlon extends an intermediate level of scrutiny to situations not
covered by Unocal and, hence, otherwise subject to evaluation
under the deferential approach of the business judgment rule.
Lyondell provides an illustration of this issue. As mentioned
above,263 Lyondell involved the sort of cash-out merger negotiated
with a solitary bidder reminiscent of Van Gorkom.264 In Van
Gorkom, the plaintiff had to establish the directors were grossly
negligent in order to prevail under the business judgment rule.265
This would appear to suggest that the business judgment
rule/gross negligence standard would also apply to Lyondell.266
Moreover, in response to the Van Gorkom decision, the Delaware
legislature amended Delaware’s corporation statute to authorize
certificates of incorporation to waive liability of directors for
monetary damages except in certain cases, including actions not
in good faith.267 Lyondell’s certificate of incorporation contained
such a waiver.268 This, in turn, suggests that good faith
established the appropriate standard for reviewing the plaintiff’s
much more willing to exercise its own judgment about the value to accord a
future strategy when it is uncertain whether the strategy will be implemented
following a change in control.
262. Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289 n.40 (Del.
1994).
263. Supra notes 231–32 and accompanying text.
264. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 238–39 (Del. 2009)
(discussing the terms of the merger).
265. See supra note 39 (discussing the standard of care applied under the
business judgment rule).
266. Because Van Gorkom predates Revlon, however, it is possible that the
Delaware Supreme Court would have applied Revlon to Van Gorkom had the
order of the decisions been reversed.
267. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011) (allowing a provision that
limits or eliminates directors’ liability for a breach of fiduciary duty, but not
allowing such a waiver for acts not in good faith).
268. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 239 (Del. 2009).
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claim in Lyondell. Yet, the court in Lyondell assumed that
accepting a cash-out offer, at least from a privately controlled
buyer, constituted the sale of control under QVC and hence fell
under Revlon.269 This suggests more rigorous scrutiny of the
board’s action than either the business judgment rule or good
faith standards. The Chancery Court in Lyondell tried to
reconcile all this by holding that the conscious failure to comply
with Revlon’s process requirements—conduct an auction, conduct
a market test, or establish the directors’ impeccable knowledge of
the market—established a lack of good faith.270 In reversing the
Chancery Court’s decision, the Delaware Supreme Court
explained that Revlon did not command any particular process.271
This, however, still leaves the question of what is the degree of
scrutiny that the court should apply. The Delaware Supreme
Court in Lyondell found it necessary for the plaintiff to establish
a lack of good faith.272 Yet, all this may show is that certificates of
incorporation can waive monetary damages from Revlon claims so
long as the directors acted in good faith. Such waivers, however,
do not apply to actions pursuing an injunction.273 Hence, the
question continues as to whether, in cases seeking injunctive
relief, Revlon mandates heightened judicial scrutiny of the
garden variety sale of the corporation for cash outside of any
takeover contest that courts for decades had reviewed under the
business judgment rule.
Beyond this, Lyondell’s application of the good faith standard
to some Revlon situations exposes a more fundamental problem:
Specifically, what is the justification for ever applying heightened
scrutiny in Revlon situations? As stated earlier,274 heightened
269. See id. at 242–43 (determining that Revlon duties did not kick in until
the board began to evaluate and negotiate the merger).
270. See id. at 242 (explaining how the trial court conflated the board’s
inaction with bad faith).
271. See id. at 242 (rejecting a process requirement).
272. See id. at 243 (requiring a finding of failure to act in good faith to find
for the plaintiffs).
273. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011) (permitting waiver of
claims for monetary damages). In fact, most cases involving Revlon seek
injunctive relief. Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 3319–20.
274. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text (discussing the higher
level of scrutiny in conflict-of-interest scenarios compared to that applied under
the business judgment rule).
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judicial scrutiny traditionally stems from concerns over conflict of
interest. As discussed later,275 concerns with conflict of interest in
a final period situation is one rationale asserted on behalf of the
Revlon doctrine. Yet, the presence of a conflict of interest means
we are dealing with a duty of loyalty, rather than a duty of care,
claim.276 Duty of loyalty claims, like claims for acts not in good
faith, are not subject to waiver under Section 102(b)(7) of
Delaware’s corporation statute.277 Hence, by abandoning strict
scrutiny of Revlon claims seeking monetary damages in favor of a
good faith standard whenever faced with a Section 102(b)(7)
waiver, the Lyondell opinion not only limits the practical impact
of Revlon, but also may substantially undercut the underlying
rationale behind the doctrine. This provides a segue into asking
whether there is any sensible rationale behind the doctrine.
IV. The Futile Search for a Sensible Underlying Rationale
Normally, courts can look to a doctrine’s underlying rationale
to help resolve the issues regarding the doctrine’s scope and
impact, which the Delaware courts have encountered in applying
Revlon. With Revlon, however, the failure of the Delaware courts
to resolve such issues satisfactorily is symptomatic of the fact
that there really is no sensible underlying rationale for the
doctrine.
A. Disparate Cases, Disparate Rationales
There are three cases in which the Delaware Supreme Court
actually held that directors, under Revlon, breached their
fiduciary duty. The result in the first two, and perhaps all three,
is reasonable. The attempt to tie the cases altogether into one
275. See infra notes 356–61 and accompanying text (explaining the
incentives problem in a final periods scenario).
276. See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 44, at 340 (describing conflict-of-interest
transactions as presenting the danger that directors “will favor themselves at
the expense of the corporation,” bringing the duty of loyalty into play).
277. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011) (stating that the certificate
of incorporation cannot eliminate or limit a director’s liability for a breach of the
duty of loyalty).
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coherent doctrine, however, has simply created unhelpful
complexity and, in turn, confusion.
1. Revlon
Revlon is really about whether directors must maximize
shareholder value, as opposed to protecting stakeholder interests,
in the rare case in which the court could not dodge the issue. As
discussed above, Revlon’s board faced a choice between two allcash bids with essentially the same impact upon the shareholders
except for the price.278 Hence, even the deference called for under
the business judgment rule (let alone the more demanding
Unocal standard) should not protect the directors if, without
explanation, they simply chose the lower price bid.279 The facts in
Revlon are a little more complicated because the directors took
the slightly higher price bid and cut off further bidding through a
lock-up agreement.280 Critically, however, the court found that
the directors had ended the auction not because the directors felt
that they had extracted the highest price but rather because the
bid, which thereby prevailed, protected the holders of certain
notes (debt) issued by Revlon.281 Hence, the question was whether
Revlon’s directors could sacrifice the highest price for the
shareholders in order to protect certain Revlon creditors.

278. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
176–78 (Del. 1986) (discussing the terms of the deals offered in the merger
transaction).
279. Notice in this regard the critical role played by the fact that the
situation involved two all-cash bids with equivalent impact upon the
shareholders except for the price. If there had been only one bid, then instead of
an easy comparison of price, there would be the much more difficult comparison
of the one bid against the future earnings prospects of the company or the
uncertain prospects for some future higher offer. Similarly, if either or both of
the two bids involved significant non-cash consideration or otherwise differed in
their impact upon the shareholders in ways less measurable than a cash price,
then again there would be a much more difficult comparison. In either of these
more difficult cases, there exist the sorts of judgmental factors that normally
make it vastly more difficult to say that directors breached their duty.
280. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179.
281. See id. at 184 (”The principal object, contrary to the board’s duty of
care, appears to have been protection of the noteholders over the shareholders’
interests.”).
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Over the years, academics have spent considerable ink
arguing over whether the directors’ duty is to maximize the
welfare of the shareholders (often called the shareholder primacy
norm) or whether the directors can sacrifice shareholder profits to
advance the interests of other stakeholders in the corporation
such as employees, creditors and the like.282 For the most part,
this debate has been more of interest to academics than
important to the actual operation of the law. While courts pay lip
service to the notion that directors must maximize shareholder
welfare, application of the business judgment rule leaves the
balancing of interests between shareholders and other corporate
stakeholders within the largely unchecked discretion of the board
of directors.
The leading case, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,283 illustrates the
point.284 Though the court’s opinion in Dodge contains oft-quoted
language to the effect that the directors breach their duty if they
act to change the end objective of the corporation from profiting
the shareholders to seeking to benefit others,285 the court actually
282. See generally Martin Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern
Corporation? Shareholder-Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light, 7
N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 641 (2011); Kent Greenfield, The Impact of “Going Private”
on Corporate Stakeholders, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 72 (2008); Margaret
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA.
L. REV. 247 (1999); E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); A.A. Berle, Jr., Note, For Whom
Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932); Milton
Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase its Profit, N.Y.
TIMES SUNDAY MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970, at 17.
283. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
284. The Dodge brothers were minority shareholders in Ford Motor Co. Id.
at 669. Henry Ford owned a majority of the outstanding stock and dominated
the board. Id. at 671. Ford Motor Co. at this time was unbelievably successful.
See id. at 670 (describing the company’s increasing profits). The Dodge brothers
sued after Henry Ford announced that the corporation would not pay any more
special dividends, but, instead, would retain the extra earnings for expansion.
Id. at 671.
285. Statements by Henry Ford, both in and out of court, suggest that his
reason for expanding the business was not to maximize profits, but, rather,
stemmed from his desire to implement his economic and social views. Id. at 671.
Specifically, Henry Ford expressed the view that the company should lower the
price of its cars and expand its production, not to increase profits, but in order to
enable more Americans to own a car and to provide employment for more
persons. Id. at 672. The court took a different view of the permissible goals of a
business corporation. Such a corporation (as opposed to an entity organized as a
nonprofit corporation) exists, the court explained, “primarily for the profit of the
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allowed Henry Ford to forgo obedience to maximizing shareholder
profits on the off chance that the shareholders might end up
better off anyway.286 The practical upshot of cases like Dodge is
that, by and large, courts have not scrutinized business decisions
to see whether directors sacrificed profit maximization to advance
the interests of employees, creditors, customers and the
community.287 Instead, the courts almost invariably accept some
rationale as to how the business decisions were in the long range
interest of the shareholders.288 The statement in Unocal that
directors can consider the interests of other constituencies, such
as employees, creditors and even the community generally, in
reacting to a takeover attempt289 is consistent with this approach.
Revlon presented an extreme situation in which the court felt
it could no longer say that advancing the interests of other
corporate constituencies (in this case, the noteholders) might
somehow benefit the shareholders in the long run.290 Normally,
stockholders.” Id. at 684.
286. See id. (refusing to interfere with the proposed expansion). The court in
Dodge ordered the payment of a special dividend; but this was only because
Ford Motor Co. had plenty of money both to expand and to pay the dividend. See
id. at 685 (noting that company’s excess of cash). Critically, however, the court
refused to block the corporation’s expansion plans, despite what the court had to
say concerning Henry Ford’s express motivations for those plans. See id. at 684
(acknowledging the court’s limited ability to determine whether the proposed
expansion was a good business decision). The court felt that the expansion plans
might serve a business purpose and refused to substitute the court’s judgment
for the business expertise of the directors. Id.
287. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public
Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 775 (2005) (noting that courts have not been
overly wary of those methods).
288. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. 1968)
(finding that defendants, directors of the Chicago Cubs, acted in the interest of
shareholders in refusing to allow night games at Wrigley Field because any
benefits to the surrounding neighborhood would be reflected in increased
attendance and increased value of the corporation’s real estate); A.P. Smith Mfg.
Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 590 (N.J. 1953) (finding that defendant corporation’s
charitable donations provided shareholders with long-term benefit).
289. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955–56 (Del.
1985) (”Examples of such concerns [affecting the reasonableness of the board’s
decision] may include . . . the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than
shareholders . . . .”).
290. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
175 (Del. 1986) (finding that consideration for other constituencies must at least
rationally benefit the shareholders).
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directors might argue that showing solicitude for the interest of
corporate creditors beyond the requirements the debt contract
can be in the long run interest of shareholders by encouraging
creditors to loan money to the company on favorable terms in the
future. There was simply no basis for such an argument in
Revlon. Significantly, there are two reasons for this, making it
uncertain whether the court relied on one, the other, or both. The
more obvious reason is that the directors were choosing between
two all-cash all-shares bids essentially equivalent in their
financing.291 Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see how
the shareholders could somehow be better off in the long run by
taking a lower priced bid on the ground that it better protected
corporate creditors. After all, having been completely cashed out
in the deal, there seems little way for the shareholders to benefit
from whatever happens to the company, including its enhanced
ability to borrow money, thereafter. The alternate reason
involved the bidders’ plans for the corporation. Specifically, they
planned to break-up Revlon and sell off its pieces.292 Breaking up
the corporation renders its good relations with creditors
irrelevant. Because the court could not come up with an
argument under these facts that what is good for stakeholders is
also good for shareholders, the Delaware Supreme Court held
that the directors could not consider the interest of the
noteholders.293 Once the court reached this conclusion, the case
was done and the rest of the opinion unnecessary.294
291. See id. at 177–79 (discussing the terms of the various bids).
292. See id. at 178 (discussing the plan for the disposition of Revlon’s
assets).
293. See id. at 182 (stating that the board could not consider the interests of
the noteholders when, because of the sale and breakup, there was no rational
benefit to the shareholders from considering the noteholders).
294. One wrinkle, however, lies in the fact that the bid protecting the
noteholders was slightly higher at the time the board effectively ended the
competition than the competing bid. A second wrinkle lies in the possibility that
the directors may have mistakenly thought themselves under some legal
obligation to the noteholders. Under these circumstances, a court which
displayed as much willingness to wink at actual motives as occurred in Dodge
might have found that Revlon’s directors acted consistently with shareholder
interests or otherwise in accord with their duty despite their actual motive or
mistake of law. The heightened scrutiny entailed by Unocal may explain this. In
other words, while Unocal allows directors to consider the interests of other
stakeholders in responding to a hostile tender offer, the heightened scrutiny
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Implicit in this analysis is a defining assumption about the
measure of shareholder welfare. Specifically, underlying the
decision in Revlon is the view that one measures the
shareholders’ interest solely in terms of the ownership in this one
corporation without regard to other investments shareholders
might have in their portfolios or other interests they might have
as members of society. Otherwise, it could be possible to
rationalize sacrificing the highest price for the Revlon stock in
favor of protecting the noteholders as still being in the
shareholders’ interest. Specifically, given the notes’ origin as
consideration received pro-rata by Revlon’s shareholders who
oversubscribed Revlon’s self-tender,295 it is quite possible that
many Revlon stockholders still held some of these notes. More
broadly, perhaps other corporations in which the Revlon
shareholders own stock could obtain loans on better terms in the
future if the Delaware court held that directors can accept lower
price bids for the company when those bids better protect
corporate creditors.296
A recent article by Stephen Bainbridge297 seems to take a
different view of the appropriate measure of shareholder interest
under Revlon. Professor Bainbridge criticizes the Delaware
Chancery Court decisions discussed above which stated that
under Unocal could mean that the court will not uncritically accept any
rationale that advancing the interest of the stakeholders in opposing a tender
offer is also in the interest of the shareholders (as it would under the business
judgment rule) but, instead, will consider for itself whether this supposition is
reasonable under the circumstances.
Of course, one might agree or disagree with Revlon’s prohibition on
directors from sacrificing the interests of the shareholders for other
stakeholders when there is no rational argument as to how this might be in the
long-range interest of the shareholders, but such debate is far beyond the scope
of this Article.
295. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (describing the initial
distribution of the notes).
296. Indeed, this could apply well beyond the facts in Revlon. Lynn Stout
and Margaret Blair’s team production theory would support an argument that
shareholders with diversified portfolios of corporate stocks could prefer to take
actions sacrificing maximum value in mergers and sales in order to protect the
interests of workers, as this would promote firm-specific investments of human
capital in other ventures in which the shareholders own, or might in the future
own, stock. See Blair & Stout, supra note 282, at 275 (arguing that it is in the
shareholders’ interest to promote workers’ investment in working for the firm).
297. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 8.
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cash-out bids trigger Revlon.298 He argues instead that only deals
which pass control to private parties come within QVC’s sale of
control trigger.299 His rationale is that a sale of control to a
publicly held buyer still enables the target company’s
stockholders to share in any benefits of the deal not reflected in
the price they received, because diversified investors are as likely
to hold shares in the buyer as they are in the target.300
Accepting this sort of portfolio-based approach to
determining shareholder interest would radically rewrite
corporate law in ways reaching far beyond Revlon. As just
discussed, it would eviscerate what little teeth Revlon gives to the
shareholder primacy norm. More radically, this portfolio theory of
shareholder interest would transform commonplace corporate
decisions into a breach of the directors’ duties. Specifically, if one
assumes that shareholders have diversified portfolios in which
they invest in competing corporations, then advertising and other
actions aimed at building market share at the expense of a
company’s publicly held competitors do not advance shareholder
interests. As a result, such actions constitute waste (actions
serving no legitimate purpose).301
2. MacMillan
MacMillan presents a different issue than Revlon.
MacMillan’s board accepted a bid for a management buyout
(MBO) over a competing bid.302 The participants in the MBO
included MacMillan’s CEO and COO (chief operating officer), the
CEO also being the chairman of MacMillan’s board.303 This
means that the board’s acceptance of this bid, including the
agreement to a lock-up provision that effectively cut off further
298. See generally id.
299. See id. at 3337–38 (discussing the “roadmap” for when Revlon applies).
300. See id. at 3310–11, 3335 (noting that fully diversified shareholders
should be indifferent to the allocation of gains between the two entities).
301. See, e.g., Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 217 (Del. 1979) (stating
that expenditures without consideration or serving no corporate purpose equal
waste).
302. Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1273 (Del.
1989).
303. Id. at 1265.
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bidding, presented a classic conflict-of-interest transaction. The
court found that the CEO and COO failed to inform the other
directors of material facts about the transaction. Specifically,
they did not inform the board that they had tipped the
individuals in charge of the MBO’s bid about the relative status
of the two bids.304 This tip had undermined the effectiveness of
the final phase of the blind auction to obtain the highest price
possible.305 The failure to disclose this conduct meant that
MacMillan’s disinterested directors acted in the mistaken belief
that a fair auction had extracted the best price the company could
get.306 As a result, the transaction was neither approved by
disinterested directors after full disclosure nor fair.307 Though the
board later affirmed its action after learning of the tip, this seems
simply to have reinforced the court’s view that the disinterested
directors lacked any independence of the CEO and COO.308
Hence, the court was correct to enjoin the transaction based upon
a straightforward breach of the duty of loyalty and the court’s
discussion of Revlon was superfluous.

304. See id. at 1277 (explaining information withheld during a board
meeting held to evaluate the two bids).
305. Confronted with two bids close in price, the financial analysts carrying
out the auction on behalf of MacMillan decided to conduct an additional round of
bidding without telling either bidder which bidder was ahead. Id. at 1275 . They
did tell MacMillan’s CEO and COO the amount of the two bids, and the CEO
and COO, in turn, passed on the relative status of the bids to the representative
bidding for the MBO. Id. Knowing it was already ahead, the MBO bidder only
slightly raised its bid. See id. at 1277 (stating that the MBO bidder increased its
bid by only $.05 per share). Mistakenly thinking that it was already ahead and
that the last round was simply an attempt to get it to bid against itself, the
other bidder did not raise its bid. Id. at 1275–77. Of course, it is possible that
the MBO bidder might have acted similarly to the other bidder had it remained
ignorant of the relative status of the two bids. Still, there is no way of knowing
whether ignorance would, instead, have prompted a more aggressive final bid by
the MBO bidder. Because the burden of proof is on the directors’ when dealing
with a conflict-of-interest transaction, the Delaware Supreme Court was correct
to hold that this unknowable doomed the agreement.
306. See id. at 1277 (describing how the board was misled into believing that
the bidding process was fair).
307. See id. at 1282–84 (noting the materiality of the nondisclosure of the
“tipping” to the other bidder).
308. See id. at 1280 (“The board was torpid, if not supine, in its efforts to
establish a truly independent auction, free of [the CEO’s] interference and
access to confidential data.”).
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3. QVC

QVC presents neither the issue of shareholder primacy
versus protecting other corporate stakeholders at the heart of the
situation in Revlon or the conflict of interest with a management
buyout found in MacMillan. The Delaware Supreme Court was
highly critical of the care exercised by Paramount’s board,309
which suggests that it might not actually have been necessary to
go beyond Unocal or even the business judgment rule to condemn
the board’s actions. If so, then the court’s result was correct and,
as with MacMillan, the court simply made its opinion
unnecessarily complex by introducing the discussion of
heightened scrutiny under Revlon.
In any event, by holding that shifting control to a single
person triggered heightened scrutiny under Revlon,310 the QVC
opinion not only substantially increased the reach of Revlon, but
also suggested a different sort of rationale for the doctrine.
Specifically, as its rationale for this trigger, the court expressed
concern with the loss of effective voting power for the unaffiliated
shareholders once a single individual owns a majority of a
corporation’s outstanding voting stock and explained that the
transaction, in essence, involved the sale of a valuable asset
belonging to the public shareholders (the ability to obtain a
premium price for selling control over the corporation).311 This
rationale, however, simply demonstrates that the decision is an
important one to the shareholders, both in terms of potential
upside (the premium they receive for selling control) and
downside (the dangers they face as minority shareholders once a
single individual obtains control). Yet, many decisions directors
make are highly important to the shareholders. Why should this
alter the court’s approach to the decision?
Perhaps the argument is one of judicial economy: in other
words, if a reason for courts deferring to corporate boards is to
avoid the burden of constantly reviewing board decisions, a rule
309. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 49
(Del. 1994) (“[T]he Paramount Board clearly gave insufficient attention to the
potential consequences of the defensive measures demanded by Viacom.”).
310. See id. at 36 (finding the board’s actions to be subject to the Revlon
standard).
311. Id. at 42–43.

1554

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485 (2013)

that says courts will focus their attention on particularly
important board decisions might logically follow. A problem with
this argument is that courts312 and commentators313 generally do
not point to judicial economy as a rationale behind judicial
deference to board decisions. Alternately, elementary notions of
reasonable conduct might suggest that the more important a
decision, the more time and attention directors should give to it.
While sensible enough, this observation hardly seems to call for a
special doctrine as opposed to a common sense application of the
business judgment rule. One suspects that courts can figure out
without any special doctrine that while a twenty-minute oral
presentation is normally more than enough before, say, the board
recommends that shareholders vote against an advisory proposal
placed by a shareholder on the corporation’s proxy statement, it
probably provides insufficient information upon which to vote for
selling the entire company. Finally, as discussed earlier,314 one
argument for requiring shareholder approval of mergers and the
like is that shareholders will pay more attention to more
important decisions. This shareholder time management
argument, however, has nothing to do with justifying greater
judicial scrutiny.
A further problem, however, with this whole rationale for
applying heightened scrutiny is that the importance of board
decisions involves infinite shades of grey in which it is difficult to
cull out some decisions as particularly critical. So, for example,
did the decision in QVC really have that much greater impact on
Paramount’s shareholders than the decision in Time had on
Time’s shareholders? The Delaware Supreme Court seems to
think so based upon a notion of reversibility. Specifically, the
court in Time argued that the Time–Warner merger did not
preclude Paramount’s acquisition because Paramount could
simply purchase Time–Warner.315 By contrast, transfer of control
312. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885–86 (2d Cir. 1982) (discussing
rationales for the business judgment rule).
313. See Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 304–21 (discussing rationales for the
business judgment rule).
314. Supra note 78 and accompanying text.
315. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140, 1150, 1155 (Del.
1989) (noting that nothing in the agreement precluded Paramount from
purchasing the combined entity)
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over Paramount to Mr. Redstone would preempt any later ability
of Paramount’s shareholders to obtain a premium for selling
control and permanently place them in a precarious position of
minority shareholders in a controlled corporation.316
Yet, this argument overstates the difference between the two
situations, which, in the end, all comes down to making or losing
money. So, to return to the situation in Time, both the Warner
and Paramount mergers seem motivated by some synergy from
combining cable networks with movie studios.317 Assume,
however, that combining two movie studios with one cable
network would at best be redundant and potentially
counterproductive—which seems to be the thinking behind
Paramount’s conduct. Assume further that Paramount’s deal was
better for the Time shareholders than the Warner deal, either
because there was greater synergy or because Paramount was
offering them a larger share of the synergistic gains. Under these
assumptions, if Paramount acquires the combined Time–Warner
company, much of the gain that the Time stockholders would
have obtained for themselves in an acquisition of Time by
Paramount is now shared with the former Warner stockholders.
After all, the Warner stockholders received a price reflecting
synergistic gains of the Time–Warner combination, which gains,
if they do nothing for Paramount, will not result in Paramount
paying a higher price for the Time–Warner combination.318
Hence, the Time–Warner merger involved significant irreversible
consequences for Time’s shareholders; otherwise, of course, there
would have been no lawsuit by the Time shareholders other than
Paramount.319 More broadly, the constant stream of corporate
316. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42–43
(Del. 1994).
317. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1143 (discussing the motivations for the Time–
Warner merger).
318. In other words, under the assumption that combining two movie
companies with one cable network would be redundant or counterproductive,
Paramount will simply pay what it would have for Time separately plus what
Warner would be worth spun off, leaving the Time shareholders uncompensated
for the extra amount Time paid for the Warner shares based upon the
synergistic value of a Time–Warner combination.
319. In the end, Paramount walked away and married another cable
network company and years later the Time shareholders could only look back
wistfully at the premium Paramount offered to pay. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hazen,
The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure, and Moral Values, 69
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bankruptcies testifies to the fact that directors make, or allow
management to make, irreversibly bad decisions of huge
importance to the shareholders all the time.320
B. Other Rationales for the Revlon Doctrine
Looking at the broader context instead of specific cases, there
are essentially two rationales one might assert on behalf of the
Revlon doctrine. The first involves the division of power between
directors and shareholders; specifically, Revlon substitutes
judicial review for the functions otherwise provided by
shareholder consent in situations in which the directors
circumvent the duel consent model for sales or combinations of
corporations by avoiding or coercing shareholder consent. The
other rationale follows the more traditional fiduciary duty
concern about situations in which directors face incentives that
might motivate them to slight corporate and shareholder
interests and argues that the incentives arising in a final period
bring Revlon situations within this concern. These rationales
overlap under the argument discussed earlier that the reason for
requiring shareholder approval of mergers and the like is to deal
with a final period incentives problem.321 While both of these
rationales have some superficial appeal, neither provides a
satisfactory explanation for the Revlon doctrine.
1. Substituting for Shareholder Consent
One rationale for the Revlon doctrine follows from viewing
Revlon in the context of the mutual consent model the law
imposes upon sales and combinations of corporations. As
N.C. L. REV. 273, 291 n.105 (1991) (pointing out the failure of the Time–Warner
stock price to match the premium offered by Paramount even several years after
the merger).
320. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106,
139–40 (Del. Ch. 2009) (invoking the business judgment rule in dealing with a
claim that the board allowed managers to lose billions of dollars in CDO
business, which led to government bailout of Citigroup).
321. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining the final period
incentives problem).
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discussed above, this model calls upon directors to propose and
shareholders to approve such transactions.322 Revlon and later
cases applying the doctrine typically involve shotgun corporate
marriages in which directors seek to bypass or coerce shareholder
acceptance of a deal favored by the board.323 Perhaps the purpose
of Revlon is to employ judicial review as a substitute for
shareholder consent in the case of such shotgun corporate
marriages. Specifically, the various impacts of Revlon might carry
out the function(s) otherwise performed by shareholder consent.
Assessing this rationale begins by asking what function
shareholder consent to sales and combinations of corporations
serves. Unfortunately, as discussed earlier, there is lack of
consensus on why the law requires shareholders to approve
mergers and asset sales.324 Still, a simple, if not simplistic,
answer is that shareholder consent helps to ensure that these
transactions are in the interest of the shareholders,325 both in the
sense that the directors have not sacrificed the interests of the
shareholders for the interests of others and in the sense that the
directors succeeded in obtaining a good deal. Matched against
this objective, one might see how the three arguable impacts
embedded in the Revlon doctrine could serve as functional
substitutes for shareholder consent.
The narrowing of acceptable goals could serve as a substitute
for shareholder consent if we assume that shareholders, in voting
on the sale of their company, would not sacrifice maximum price
for themselves in order to advance the interests of other corporate
stakeholders, and if we also assume that shareholders, in voting
on the sale of their company, will focus on immediate market
values. Of course, it is possible that shareholders might be
sufficiently altruistic—or sufficiently aware of the impact which
322. See supra notes 20–21, 62–64 and accompanying text (discussing the
roles of directors and shareholders).
323. Revlon, MacMillan, and QVC all involved challenges to significant lockups for the favored bidders. See supra notes 126, 159, 303 and accompanying
text (noting protective devices used in those cases).
324. Supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
325. See, e.g., John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Shareholder Rights and
Legislative Wrongs: Toward Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1425, 1505 (1991) (“The shareholders are in the best position to weigh the
competing alternatives; given substantial, if not perfect, information from both
sides, the shareholders’ vote must be afforded great weight.”).
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the treatment of creditors, employees and the like might have on
other companies in their stock portfolios326—that they would
agree to transactions in which they did not receive top dollar at
the expense of other constituencies. Alternately, it is possible that
shareholders might be sufficiently heterogeneous in their
valuations of potential combinations such that they would not
rely on market valuations in choosing between bids.327 In either
case, Revlon would go beyond being a functional substitute for
shareholder consent to the extent it limits the permissible goal
for a corporate sale to the highest price for the shareholders.
Heightened judicial scrutiny of the wisdom of the directors’
decision, potentially coupled with mandated processes directors
must follow to establish that they obtained the best deal for the
shareholders, might serve as a functional substitute for a
shareholder vote in ensuring that the directors made a good deal.
In this instance, judicial review places the court in the position of
a super-shareholder whose judgment serves as a surrogate for an
un-coerced shareholder vote.328
Of course, all this assumes that shareholder consent plays an
important role in protecting shareholder interests. If instead
shareholder approval is simply an unnecessary vestige hanging
on from traditions transported into corporate law from
partnership and contract law,329 then it is unnecessary to create a
functional substitute through judicial review. Alternately, if
shareholder consent is seen as a value for its own sake, perhaps
in the sense of providing democratic legitimacy to fundamental
constitutional changes, then judicial review is not a functional
substitute.
So far, the notion that Revlon provides a functional
substitute for shareholder consent looks quite plausible. Things
326. See supra note 296 and accompanying text (noting a possible reason
why shareholders might consider the interests of other stakeholders).
327. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums?
Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1244–52
(1990) (arguing that because of heterogeneous expectations, shareholders often
value their stock differently than the market price).
328. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 266 (Del. 2000) (establishing
liability merely because the court disagrees with what the directors did would
inappropriately turn the court into a super-director).
329. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (noting the historic,
contractual basis for requiring shareholder consent).
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start to break down, however, when one compares the boundaries
of the Revlon doctrine to the situations in which directors have
circumvented requirements for shareholder consent to sales and
combinations of corporations.
Time is all about directors circumventing the requirement for
shareholder consent. The Time–Warner combination avoided a
requirement under Delaware law for a vote by Time’s
shareholders by structuring the deal as a triangular merger of
Warner with a Time subsidiary rather than a merger into Time
itself.330 Hence, the shareholder on the Time side who voted on
the merger was Time, acting through a decision of its board, not
its shareholders.331 Under the original structure of the deal,
however, stock exchange rules demanded a vote by Time
shareholders because of the quantity of stock that Time would
issue to the Warner shareholders in the merger.332 Time’s board
triggered the lawsuit by changing the consideration given to the
Warner shareholders from Time stock to cash and securities.333
The motive for this was to remove the requirement under the
stock exchange rules that Time’s shareholders get to vote on the
deal.334 Yet, the Delaware courts held that depriving Time’s
shareholders of a vote did not trigger Revlon.335 This is hardly
consistent with the notion that the purpose of Revlon is to
substitute heightened judicial scrutiny for shareholder consent.336
330. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140, 1145–46 (Del.
1989).
331. Id. at 1146.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1148.
334. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (explaining that the deal no
longer required approval by Time’s shareholders).
335. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1151 (finding that the actions of Time’s directors
did not trigger Revlon duties).
336. One might argue that Delaware courts do not need to provide
substitute protection for a shareholder vote when the requirement for a vote
would not have come from Delaware law. Yet, the fact remains that Time’s
directors also used deal structure—a triangular merger—to avoid Delaware’s
requirement for a vote by Time’s shareholders. While the original motivation for
a triangular merger was not to preclude a vote by Time’s shareholders, Time’s
directors presumably could have restructured the Warner transaction into a
triangular merger if it had not started as such when, in response to
Paramount’s bid, they sought to preclude a vote by Time’s shareholders on the
Time–Warner combination.
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Perhaps the notion is that Revlon should serve as a
substitute for shareholder consent when directors may have
coerced such consent by deal protection devices but not when
directors have avoided the requirement for such consent
altogether by the structure of the deal. If so, one must work hard
to justify such a distinction. Moreover, the boundaries of Revlon
are not co-terminus with situations in which there are deal
protection devices with potentially coercive impact. Specifically,
Revlon does not reach transactions having deal protection devices
unless the transactions involve the break-up or dissolution of the
target after an auction or in response to a hostile bid or else
involve the sale of control as defined in QVC. Hence, the
Delaware Supreme Court refused to apply Revlon in Santa Fe
Pacific despite the fact that the merger agreement with the
favored bidder included deal protection devices.337
Maybe this simply goes to show that the boundaries of
Revlon need redesign. Specifically, under this analysis, the
boundaries of Revlon should match the situations in which boards
have avoided or coerced shareholder consent. Yet, this may
simply worsen the problems the Delaware courts face in
determining the borders of Revlon. A pragmatic argument in
favor of the Delaware Supreme Court’s rejection in Hariton of
attempting through the de facto merger doctrine to create
equivalent shareholder rights despite differences in deal
structure is the inevitably difficult line drawing problems this
would entail.338 Determining the impact of deal protection devices
on shareholder choice also can be challenging.339 Ultimately, the
only way to resolve this line drawing problem is to have a
coherent theory for when shareholders should possess the right to
an uncoerced vote on a transaction and when deal protection
devices sufficiently constrain the shareholder vote so as to fatally
undermine the vote’s efficacy. If, however, there is such a
337. In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 64, 71 (Del.
1995). See also supra note 109 (citing a case in which the Delaware Supreme
Court reviewed deal protection provisions under Unocal because the transaction
did not come within Revlon).
338. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 76, at 240–44 (discussing the difficulty of
determining when investors should get the appraisal remedy).
339. See supra notes 81–88 and accompanying text (evaluating the effects of
lock-ups).
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coherent theory, the question will become why we need Revlon.
Specifically, the substitute for shareholder consent rationale
proposes a presumably second best solution without asking why
one is settling for second best. Instead of establishing judicial
review as a substitute for uncoerced shareholder consent, maybe
the answer is to preserve uncoerced shareholder consent. If there
is a coherent theory to provide guidelines for when the law should
require shareholder consent then it would become relatively
straightforward for the legislature or the courts to adopt rules
preserving the requirement for shareholder consent despite
differences in deal structure that do not, under the theory, justify
avoiding such consent.340 Similarly, if there is a point at which
one can say that a deal protection device fatally interferes with
the efficacy of a shareholder vote critical to protecting the
shareholders’ interest, a simple solution may be to ban such a
deal protection device.341
2. The Final Period Incentives Rationale
The alternate rationale for the Revlon doctrine returns to
traditional fiduciary duty analysis. As discussed earlier, this
analysis starts with courts granting deference to board decisions
under the business judgment rule.342 The justification for any
greater level of scrutiny normally comes from concerns with
conflicts of interest that might cause the directors to sacrifice
corporate or shareholder interests to advance the interests of the
directors themselves or of those with significant affiliations to the
directors.343 Fitting Revlon into this justification means finding
some conflict of interest on the part of directors in situations
covered by the doctrine.

340. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1200 et. seq. (2000) (creating parallel
shareholder rights in a merger, asset sale, or stock purchase whenever the
transaction equals a “reorganization”).
341. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing proposals to ban
lock-ups that meet certain criteria).
342. Supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text (explaining the enhanced
level of scrutiny applied in conflict-of-interest transactions).
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Revlon itself involved favoritism for a white knight brought
in to defeat a hostile tender offer.344 As such, the court seemingly
faced the positional conflict of interest present in takeover
defenses. Still, this does not call for a new rule with increased
scrutiny because the Unocal doctrine already provides added
scrutiny of takeover defenses.
Actually, the white knight situation would generally seem to
call for less, rather than more, scrutiny than otherwise applied
under Unocal. This is because the white knight situation
typically presents less positional conflict of interest than a
situation in which the target corporation remains independent.
After all, the positional conflict of interest arises from the normal
desire of those in power to retain their power. A sale to a white
knight presumably will lessen the power of the target’s directors.
The greatest reduction in the power of the target’s directors, and
accordingly the weakest positional conflict, occurs in a sale
leading to the dissolution or bust-up of the target that would not
leave a corporation for the target’s directors to direct. Yet, this is
the transaction that occurred in Revlon.345 Even if the target
corporation continues, and even if the white knight keeps the
target’s pre-acquisition directors on the target’s board, they now
answer to a single shareholder instead of enjoying the freedom
made possible when stock is widely scattered among the
rationally apathetic.346 In fact, the worst positional conflict in the
white knight situation occurs if the transaction entails a so-called
merger of equals between public companies in which the target’s
directors end up on the board of a corporation without a
controlling shareholder and so have lost little power at all. Yet,
this is the situation least likely covered by Revlon.347
Perhaps the target’s executives will continue to manage the
company or a significant operational component after the white
knight purchases control. Even so, this would still seem to
present less of a conflict of interest than a decision to remain
344. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184
(Del. 1986).
345. See id. at 178 (describing the bust-up transaction proposed in Revlon).
346. See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 44, at 232 (discussing rational apathy of
shareholders in a public corporation).
347. See supra notes 163–66 and accompanying text (comparing Time and
QVC).
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independent. This is because Revlon involves a challenge to a
decision by the board and not by the executives.348 Of course,
some executives may also be directors. More broadly, a realistic
assessment of board dynamics commonly shows the influence
possessed by executives, and especially the CEO, over outside
directors.349 Still, belief in the ability of nominally disinterested
directors to protect the corporation from executive conflicts reigns
as a central tenet of corporate law. This is evidenced by section
144 of Delaware’s corporation law, which allows the vote of
disinterested directors to cure conflicts of interest by directors or
officers.350 Indeed, the most dramatic conflict-of-interest
transaction involving corporate executives, the setting of their
compensation, generally falls within the business judgment rule
by virtue of disinterested director approval.351 In any event, even
if one viewed the target’s board to be the supine tool of the
target’s executives or such executives are on the board, and even
if some of those executives maintain executive positions after the
white knight takes over, this would still not change the basic
calculation that the positional conflict of interest is weaker with a
white knight than with takeover defenses that would keep the
target independent. After all, despite keeping their executive
positions, the target’s executives have gone from a situation in
which, by hypothesis, they were on or able to control the board
ostensibly supervising them, to a situation in which the
presumably more independently minded managers of the white
knight now have ultimate control.
Of course, if corporate directors or executives take a
significant financial stake in the white knight purchaser (as in an
348. See supra notes 126–28, 157–60, 303–04 and accompanying text
(discussing the challenged board decisions in Revlon, QVC, and MacMillan).
349. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management
and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1241–42 (2002) (stating that Enron’s board was “a splendid
board on paper” and its failure “reveal[s] a certain weakness with the board as a
governance mechanism”); Rita Komik, Greenmail: A Study of Board
Performance in Corporate Governance, 32 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 163, 166–67 (1987)
(describing a modern board as a “co-opted appendage institution”).
350. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2011).
351. See, e.g., Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 225 (Del. 1979) (applying
the business judgment rule to executive compensation because of disinterested
director approval).
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MBO), then the conflict of interest in the transaction rises above
being simply a positional conflict of interest of directors seeking
to keep their control. Now, however, we are back to the
protections already accorded the corporation from conflict-ofinterest transactions with firms in which their directors or
officers have a material financial interest. As discussed above
when addressing MacMillan,352 these protections can deal with
managerial overreach in MBO transactions without the need to
invoke Revlon.
Even so, many scholars attempt to justify Revlon as
necessary to deal with side deals the target firm’s management
might make with a bidder under which the target’s directors will
favor the bidder in exchange for future employment or the like.353
The simple answer, however, is to recognize the conflict of
interest such side deals can create and invoke the higher scrutiny
required of conflict-of-interest transactions.354 By contrast,
attempting to address the problem of side deals by invoking the
Revlon doctrine is both under-inclusive insofar as Revlon does not
apply to the host of corporate sales in which there could be a side
deal and over-inclusive insofar as Revlon subjects sales in which
there is no side deal to heightened scrutiny.355
The question thus becomes whether there is some conflict of
interest inherent in Revlon situations that is not otherwise
addressed either by normal duty of loyalty analysis or by Unocal.
Academic commentary,356 joined by some Chancery Court
opinions,357 asserts that the final period incentives problem
352. Supra notes 303–08 and accompanying text.
353. See Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 35 (explaining concerns about side
deals).
354. See, e.g., Smith v. Good Music Station, Inc., 129 A.2d 242, 246–47 (Del.
Ch. 1957) (stating that simultaneous negotiation of sale of business and
employment contracts for board members triggers heightened judicial scrutiny).
355. Federal securities law reporting requirements would seem to limit the
concern that such side deals will remain secret. See, e.g., Fraidin & Hanson,
supra note 84, at 1786 (noting that substantial disclosure requirements during
an acquisition make it unlikely that board members could receive side payments
in secret).
356. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period
of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1947 (2003) (describing the final period
incentives problem as a “structural dilemma in corporate law”).
357. See, e.g., Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 458–59 (Del.
Ch. 2011) (explaining why final stage transactions warrant enhanced scrutiny).
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presents such a conflict of interest. The final period incentives
rationale begins with the observation that directors and
executives face a variety of constraints on engaging in poor
behavior (disloyal or careless conduct) or, put more positively,
have a variety of incentives for doing a good job. For example,
poor performance by directors and executives might hurt the
corporation in product markets and markets for capital, which, in
turn, can impact compensation and job security of corporate
managers, while good corporate performance in product and
capital markets can yield increased compensation and job
security.358 Good reputation resulting from good performance
might also impact executives and directors as they compete for
advancement in labor markets both internal and external to the
corporation, while poor performance will have the opposite
effect.359 Dissatisfaction by those holding the ultimate power to
dismiss executives (more senior executives and directors) or
directors (the shareholders) impacts job security, creating an
incentive to keep more senior executives, directors, and
shareholders happy.360
Many of these constraints and incentives lose their force if
directors or executives learn that the corporation will cease
operations or that new owners plan to terminate existing
directors or executives. So, if directors and executives learn that
the corporation will terminate operations, their concern with
maintaining the corporation’s competitive position in product and
capital markets ceases to be a motivating factor. Alternately, if
directors and executives learn that new owners plan their
removal—even though continuing corporate operations—the
directors and executives will no longer worry about maintaining
job security or seeking advancement within this corporation.
This, in turn, creates the argument that sales leading to the bust358. See, e.g., David M. Phillips, Principles of Corporate Governance: A
Critique of Part IV, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 653, 681–82 (1984) (discussing the
effect the success in a product market can have on corporate performance).
359. See, e.g., Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board
in Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals
Compared, 44 BUS. LAW. 503, 526 (1989) (arguing that market forces discipline
executives).
360. But see, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 48, at 1496 (arguing the impact is
weak at the most senior level).
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up or dissolution of the corporation or to a change in control over
the corporation (Revlon situations) produce a final period between
the time it becomes obvious that corporate operations will
terminate or directors and executives will lose their positions and
the actual termination or removal.361 During this time, directors
and executives have less incentive toward good performance.
This final period rationale is different in a fundamental way
from the conflict-of-interest concerns that traditionally lead to
increased scrutiny of board decisions. With conflicts of interest,
directors face incentives that affirmatively encourage them to act
in ways contrary to the corporation’s or the shareholders’
interests. So, in a transaction between a director and the
corporation in which he or she is a director, the director has an
incentive to give him or herself a better deal than the corporation
receives. Less extreme, but still similar, the normal human desire
to retain power, not to mention whatever compensation or
perquisites go with the position, give directors an incentive to
oppose hostile tender offers that might be in the corporation’s or
shareholders’ interest. By contrast, the final period argument, in
itself, does not posit any incentive that affirmatively encourages
directors to sacrifice corporate or shareholder interests. Rather,
the argument is that the directors will not have as much
incentive as they normally do to make the right decision for the
corporation and its shareholders. In other words, the concern is
not with bad incentives but with less good incentives.
This distinction, in turn, suggests the need for great caution
before applying heightened scrutiny merely because the situation
involves a final period problem. Corporate law already faces a
difficult challenge when dealing with conflicts of interest in which
directors have affirmative incentives to sacrifice corporate or
shareholder welfare in favor of personal ends. This is because the
bipolar approach—great deference under the business judgment
rule versus intense scrutiny under the fairness test—fits
awkwardly when matched against the reality that directors
commonly face a host of subtle conflicts of various degrees that
may affirmatively encourage them to sacrifice corporate or
361. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 356, at 1945–47 (arguing that during this
period, directors and executives are less likely to identify the old company as
“theirs,” and therefore may be less likely to act in the old company’s interest).
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shareholder interests.362 On rare occasions, Unocal being one,
courts have responded to this reality by creating intermediate
levels of review.363 By and large, however, courts have eschewed
such an approach. The reason is simple: such an approach would
create an extraordinarily difficult level of complexity in
application.364
This complexity would increase exponentially if, in addition
to applying new levels of scrutiny when presented with all the
sort of conflicts that affirmatively entice directors to disregard
corporate or shareholder interests, courts also applied different
levels of scrutiny to situations in which there are reduced
incentives encouraging directors to advance corporate and
shareholder interests. This is because there are a host of
situations beyond the final period problem associated with the
sale of a corporation in which directors may have reduced
incentives toward optimal performance.
To begin with, the final period situation involving the sale of
a corporation is not the only final period situation, and, indeed,
may not even be the most important final period situation. The
inevitability of aging presents each director and executive with
his or her own final period situation. The impact of Van Gorkom’s
impending retirement on the events in the Van Gorkom case
provides an example of this.365 By contrast, directors or
executives in mid-career may have plenty of incentive to do a
good job in order to preserve their reputation and position in the
362. See, e.g., In re RJR Nabisco S’holders Litig., CIV. A. No. 10389, 1989
WL 7036, at *1159 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (“Greed is not the only human
emotion that can pull one from the path of propriety; so might hatred, lust,
envy, revenge, or, as is here alleged, shame or pride. Indeed any human emotion
may cause a director to place his own interests, preferences or appetites before
the welfare of the corporation.”).
363. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text (explaining the Unocal
test).
364. See, e.g., Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292–93 (3d Cir. 1980)
(stating that the business judgment rule is based on the recognition that all
director decisions involve some personal interest but it would be impractical to
take this into account).
365. Van Gorkom’s approaching retirement seems to have motivated him to
seek a quick sale—which would provide him a healthy nest egg—rather than
worrying about getting the top dollar. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 356, at
1955–56 (noting that Van Gorkom’s retirement could have played a role in his
actions).

1568

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485 (2013)

managerial labor market even if they will never face another
election by the target’s shareholders or review by seniors within
the target corporation.366 Beyond this, compensation schemes and
stock ownership create different degrees of incentive toward good
performance.367 Does this mean courts should apply a higher
degree of scrutiny to a board decision if the directors do not own
much stock in their corporation or do not receive compensation
dependent upon corporate performance and so may have limited
financial incentives for making good decisions? How about
directors of nonprofit corporations who may not receive any
compensation?368 Should their decisions be subjected to stricter
scrutiny because of less financial incentive to do a good job? As
suggested by this last example, outside directors on a corporate
board can have complex motives for being directors369 and, in
turn, for performance. An outside director who is highly
accomplished in his or her primary position might have far less
incentive for good performance than a director for which this
board position creates greater impacts on career prospects and
satisfaction. Should courts apply higher scrutiny to boards with
larger numbers of more accomplished directors?
Perhaps one might attempt to distinguish these other
reduced incentive situations from the final period problem arising
with the sale of the company by arguing that the problem here is
a combination of less good incentives with more bad incentives.
Specifically, when selling the corporation, the combination of a
final period situation with the former owners and an anticipated
relationship with the new owner(s) can give managers an
366. See generally Dooley & Veasey, supra note 359.
367. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability
Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 276 (1986) (noting that compensation schemes
that include stock compensation can align managerial interests with those of
the investors).
368. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hazen & Lisa L. Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit
Corporate Governance - A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary
Duties, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 347, 364 (2012) (pointing out that directors of
nonprofit corporations are often not paid).
369. See, e.g., Susan S. Boran, et al., Why They Still Do It: Directors
Motivations for Joining a Board, POINT OF VIEW 3 (Dec. 2010),
http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib/wtsd_pov10.pdf (considering
why directors join boards).
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incentive to favor prematurely the interest of the expected new
owner(s) over the interest of the departing owners in negotiating
the sale. Indeed, this might suggest a different sort of rationale
for the distinction drawn in Time and QVC between sales leaving
control in the market and sales to controlling individuals. One
might argue that so long as control remains in the market,
managers have an incentive to avoid developing a reputation for
being willing to sell out the set of public investors to which they
had a duty at the time because the public investors after the
transaction will not trust such managers not to do the same to
them in the future. On the other hand, the same thinking could
be true even when the new controlling owner is an individual.
Managers might think twice before beginning their relationship
with their new boss with actions that will give their new boss
grounds to suspect their future trustworthiness.370 Moreover,
while this shifting loyalties rationale might explain Revlon in sale
of control situations, it does not fit break-up or dissolution of the
corporation situations in which managers will not retain their
positions. In any event, this seems to bring us back to the
previous discussion of white knights and side deals and how
existing doctrines can address this without Revlon.
Beyond all this, the final period argument is entirely upside
down. To the extent that it often focuses on executives rather
than directors, it is, as pointed out above,371 looking at the wrong
people: Revlon involves challenges to decisions by the board.
Focusing on the board, what exactly is the constraint on the
board’s conduct that the final period removes? The answer is that
the directors will no longer face the need to go before the target’s
shareholders for reelection; in political parlance, they are lame
ducks. Of course, given how infrequently directors of publicly
traded companies are deposed in an election,372 one must question
how much of a constraint actually arises from the need to keep
the shareholder electorate happy. The more realistic threat for a
370. See, e.g., Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 84, at 1811 (noting that the
buyer may perceive target management as a liability if it acts disloyally to the
former shareholders).
371. Supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.
372. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93
VA. L. REV. 675, 682–83 (2007) (reporting the small number of contested proxy
solicitations).
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poorly performing board typically lies in removal through a
hostile tender offer.373 This suggests that the final period problem
is something of a mirror to the positional conflict of interest that
directors face in responding to a hostile tender offer.
Yet, the incentive problem in a final period situation is only a
pale reflection of the incentive at work in the hostile takeover
situation. In the final period situation, the directors lose the
incentive for good performance that arose before the final period
from the abstract concern that at some future time a sufficiently
poor level of corporate performance might lead to a threat to their
continued control. By contrast, when facing a hostile tender offer,
the directors confront the immediate and real prospect of being
dethroned. One does not need an exhaustive search into the
literature on psychology to recognize that people will react much
more to the immediate and concrete than to the abstract and
future.374 What this means is that efforts to remain independent
in the face of an impending hostile takeover always present a
greater danger of directors acting contrary to shareholder
interests than the final period problem creates by rendering
irrelevant concerns of more distant threat to one’s position.375
Hence, the notion that the final period situation justifies greater
scrutiny under the Revlon doctrine than the threat of a hostile
takeover calls for under Unocal is wrong.

373. See, e.g., Manne, supra note 30, at 115–17 (suggesting that tender
offers are more likely than proxy contests to remove directors).
374. See, e.g., Ahmad R. Hariri et al., Preference for Immediate Over Delayed
Rewards Is Associated with Magnitude of Ventral Striatal Activity, 26 J.
NEUROSCIENCE 13213, 13123 (Dec. 20, 2006) (“People naturally favor . . .
rewards received sooner rather than later . . . .”).
375. Admittedly, a final period situation presents an immediate and
concrete reality just like a takeover threat. Unlike the takeover situation,
however, the incentive problem in the final period situation does not gain its
strength from the need to address a new concrete threat. Rather, the problem
stems from the removal of incentives that existed before the final period
situation. Hence, the impact cannot be any stronger than the incentives for good
behavior that existed before the final period: the incentives that involved an
abstract and distant threat.
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VI. Conclusion

In the end, the Revlon doctrine has been an expensive
distraction, consuming countless billable hours and valuable
judicial time arguing over whether the doctrine applies—most
recently in the continuing controversy over whether cash bids by
public companies trigger Revlon.376 Such arguments seem more
suited to medieval monks than to corporate attorneys and a
sophisticated judiciary, given that no one is really sure what the
doctrine does anyway and no one has put forth a persuasive
rationale for having the doctrine. It is time to remove Revlon from
the face of corporate law.

376. See supra notes 172–94 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of
how Revlon is triggered).

